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                                                    ABSTRACT 
 
 
Nigeria is going through a difficult political and economic transition 
after forty years of independence. Yet, Nigeria remains a society rich in 
cultural, linguistic, religious, ethnic and political diversity. Today, the 
average Nigerian struggles hard to make ends meet; sees himself or 
herself as being poorer than he or she was a decade ago; and finds it 
hard to be hopeful that things will get better soon. It is against this 
background that this project sets out to increase the knowledge about 
state capacity in Nigeria by taking stock of economic and governance 
issues. Using a simple growth model, we illustrate the interrelationships 
between natural resources, corruption and economic growth in Nigeria; 
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 1.0 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
“Father in Heaven, you always provide for all your creatures so that all may 
live as you have willed. You have blessed our country Nigeria with rich 
human and natural resources to be used to your honor and glory and for 
the well being of every Nigerian. We are deeply sorry for the wrong use of 
these your gifts and blessing through acts of injustice, bribery and 
corruption, as a result of which many of our people are hungry, sick, 
ignorant and defenseless. Father, you alone can heal us and our nation of 
this sickness. We beg you; touch our lives and the lives of our leaders and 
people so that we may all realize the evil effect of bribery and corruption 
and work hard to eliminate it. Raise up for us God-fearing people and 
leaders who care for us and who will lead us in the path of peace, 
prosperity and progress” [CBCN, 1998] 
 
  Unlike a fiscal system with a single level of government only, we 
must now allow for the fact that fiscal operations are typically carried out 
by many units of government or jurisdictions. H ere, this multiple unit 
system includes the federal government, States government and local 
governments. This multiunit fiscal structure (three-tier arrangement) 
reflects the historical forces of nation making, wars and geography. 
Compared with that of most other countries, the fiscal structure of Nigeria 
has developed along relatively decentralized lines. At the same time, it has 
shown flexibility toward changing needs and attitudes, as evidenced by the expanding role of inter governmental transfers and the reassignment of 
fiscal responsibilities over the last decade. Specifically, the Nigeria 
Constitution (1999) has it that the federation shall maintain a special 
account to be called “ the Federation Account” into which shall be paid all 
revenues collected by the government of the federation, except the 
proceeds from the personal income tax of the personnel of the Armed 
forces of the federation, the Nigeria police force, the ministry or department 
of government charged with the responsibility for external affairs and the 
residents of the federal capital territory Abuja 
  However, these legal requirements may be impracticable without 
good governance. Hence, the World Bank (1994) identified three distinct 
aspects of governance: the form of political regime; the process by which 
authority exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development; and the capacity of governments to design, 
formulate and implement policies and discharge functions. But regional 
progress is usually reported under the four major components of 
governance: public sector management; accountability; legal framework 
for development; and transparency and information. Yet, public sector 
management (in relation to fiscal federalism) is the most visible of these 
four dimensions of governance. It has to de with the capacity of 
governments to make and implement public policy, the effectiveness of 
public programs and the strength of public institutions. The subject matter 
of public sector management is the means to achieve those parts (the civil service, the government budget, the public investment program, 
accounting, auditing and other financial management systems, strategic 
planning and program evaluation, aid coordination, economic management 
agencies, the cabinet  system and other parts of the machinery of 
government that are essential to a well-functioning public sector. In 
addition, it is equally concerned with the relationship between central 
government agencies and public enterprises on the other hand, and 
between central and subordinate tiers of government on the other (World 
bank, 1994). And yet, widespread corruption remains a symptom of a 
poorly functioning state as witnessed in most developing countries such 
as Nigeria 
  Indeed, those who pay and receive bribes can expropriate a nation’s 
wealth, leaving little for its poorest citizens. Where corruption is 
systematic, Nigeria with extensive natural resources may fail to develop in 
a way that benefits ordinary citizens. Highly corrupt county face particular 
challenges even when controlled by reform-minded rulers. Reforming 
public institutions and government policies is essential but poverty limits 
available options. 
Policymakers, however, can arrive at plausible conclusions only after 
understanding corruption’s e ffect on the efficiency and equity of an 
economic system corruption can therefore be defined as the use of public 
office for private gain and this include bribery and extortion which 
necessarily involve at least two parties and other types of malfeasance that a public official can carry out alone (including fraud and embezzlement). In 
most cases, corruption is entrenched, embedded in a social setting that 
both shows it consequences and helps sustain it. Entrenched corruption 
can be political, bureaucratic or both grows out of and helps perpetuate the 
development problems as well as diverting development resources and 
saps the political and social vitality societies need to use aid effectively. It 
is in such a case that corruption does the most to keep poor nations poor 
(Johnston, 1997)  
  Entrenched corruption is well organized and embedded in a political 
and helps sustain it. In fact, it is best thought of as equilibrium, an 
understanding of which can help explain its origins and tenacity. But it is 
not the only possible equilibrium: by altering the political and economic 
environment it is possible to shift toward low-corruption, higher growth 
equilibrium that benefit from and help sustain accountable politics and 
administration.  
Although political and bureaucratic corruption differs, both could be 
considered entrenched if they are pressure organized and monopolistic. 
Here perverse means that corruption is so common that there are few 
practical alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials (Rose – Ackerman, 
1996, Olderburg 1997). Organized corruption involves internal coordination, 
shared knowledge, and a vertical exchange of benefits. It facilitate an 
internal economy linking principals and agents Principals provide 
protection makes major Decisions, control agents discretion and powers, and confer or withhold shares of the take. Political or bureaucratic agents 
pay their agents through loyal support. When political corruption is 
entrenched, political activity is dominated by a monopolistic organization 
or factor that maintains its power in part through corruption and reaps 
large rewards from it. For entrenched   bureaucratic corruption, the 
situation is different. Several agencies might deal with one sector of the 
economy but in specialized ways: one might regulate working conditions, 
another inspects products, and yet another collects taxes. These agencies 
usually cannot abolish one another or drive each other out of the 
corruption business. But they can collide creating lasting and lucrative 
corruption networks that feed on and help sustain economic and political 
dependence. 
  Where bureaucratic corruption is not pervasive, some officials may 
take bribes as opportunity allows. Most do not, however, nor do they 
systematically seek them out. However, vertically organized bureaucratic 
corruption is a significant step toward entrenchment. Here, a portion of the 
agents take is shared with principals and emphasis shifts from corruption 
without theft “corruption with theft”. In the first case agents keep aside 
payment but pass the full nominal price of a good to the public treasury; 
while in the second case, agents keep some or all of the fee and the 
treasury receives little or nothing. Low – level agents who do not enjoy 
protection will find corruption without theft easier to conceal or will at least 
keep theft within limits to avoid notice. But with vertical organization corruption with theft grows rapidly both because of the increasing number 
of claimants to take and because of the official protection that corruption 
enjoys political corruption and bureaucratic corruption can therefore 
flourish in each other’s absence. But in most cases, the two types of 
corruption coexist and may be introduced. Political corruption can intrude 
into the bureaucracy as well as the bureaucratic corruption can become a 
factor in politics. Different connections between political and bureaucratic 
corruption produce different patterns of extended clientelism in society but 
the more serious either types of corruption becomes, the less likely it is to 
exist independently. An interlocked system of entrenched bureaucratic and 
political corruption is a powerful force: rents can be   coordinated and 
shared across both realms while monopoly power allows politicians 
preempt opposition Economic policies can minimize corruption while 
curtailing competition. There will be few opportunities for direct 
competition. There will be few opportunities for direct countervailing 
actions, and illicit responses will require the indulgence of corrupt officials.  
  The debate on the effects of corruption is very fervent. Some authors 
have suggested that corruption might raise economic growth through two 
types of mechanisms. Corrupt practices such as “speed money” would be 
enable individual to avoid bureaucratic delay while government employees 
who are allowed to levy bribes would work harder especially where bribes 
act as a piece rate [Leff, 1964, Huntinton, 1968] many recent studies [North, 
1990, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993] have argued that malfunctioning government institutions severely harm economic performance through the 
reduction in both incentive and opportunities to invest and innovate, Thus, 
corruption has received particular attention by both policy makers and 
researchers as the recent availability of corruption measures  has helped to 
quantify its extent and allowed international comparisons. 
  Econometrician have recently weighed into the debates as Mauro 
(1995) pioneering study and the Transparency International (TI) has now 
brought to the attention of researchers the availability of corruption indices 
and prompted a number of empirical investigations into the effects of 
corruption on various aspects of economic performance. Tanzi (1998) List 
the significant econometric findings to date of the effects of corruption on 
the level of investment, the productivity of public investment and the level 
of maintenance expenditures, the level of foreign direct investment, the 
level of education and health expenditures and the level of tax revenue. Our 
present study therefore constitutes a first step towards an investigation of 
the effect of natural resources on corruption and growth. This is in addition 
to the modeling the government’s anti-corruption practices as the 
response of an optimizing agent, which would allow, inter alias, a formal 
derivation of the need for, and the extent of, infrastructure and 





 2.0 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
The board objective of this paper is to theoretically and empirically 
investigate the channel through which the natural resources might affect a 
country’s economic growth, that is through an increase in rent – seeking 
activities. Our specific research questions include: 
[1] What factors determine the incidence of corruption and what role does 
the abundance of natural resources play in Nigeria? 
 
[2] What factors determine the extent of corruption and how one can 
explain the stylized fact that resources rich economy tend to grow slower. 
 






 3.0 NIGERIA POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Like other parts of West Africa, the areas that eventually became part 
of Nigeria has a long – established traditional society Nigeria has an area of 
923,768sq km and is bounded by Niger on the north, by Chad and 
Cameroon on the east by the Gulf of guinea on the south, and by Benin on 
the west. During the 19
th century, there were many local rulers, who 
assigned card for cultivation, controlled trade, and collected taxes. 
Agriculture, using shifting cultivation and simple implements, was mainly 
for subsistence, though there was some exchange of surpluses in local 
markets. There was a network of village markets in which farmers could 
exchange produce for handicrafts. After about 1830, exports of palm oil 
and kernels, primarily to Britain gradually replaced the dying share trade. 
Although the initial base was small, the growth rate of export and imports 
was high. 
British penetration first occurred through ship owners and chartered 
merchant companies with political authority developing later. The initial 
contacts were confined to coastal areas because of transport  difficulties, 
endemic malaria and tribal warfare in the interior. Lagos was ceded to 
Britain in 1861 and in 1886, an oil river protectorate (Southern Nigeria) was 
established over Niger Delta. In 1900, the northern territories were taken 
over (Britain) which became the protectorate of Northern Nigeria. In 1914, 
Northern and Southern protectorates were merged and thus, modern 
Nigeria like most other African state is a colonial creation.   The primary reason for amalgamation was economic rather than 
political. The northern protectorate, which became the Northern province, 
had annual budget deficits, while the Southern protectorate that became 
the Southern province had surpluses. To eliminate the subventions from 
the British treasury, the budgets of the two components were integrated. 
Some central institutions were also established to anchor the evolving 
clarified structure. The first Governor general (Frederic Lugard) organized a 
central secretariat at Lagos and established the Nigeria Council to provide 
a forum for representative. Drawn from the provinces. 
  The process of unification wars undermined by the persistence of 
different regional perspective on governance between the Northern and 
Southern provinces. While Southern colonial administrators welcomed 
amalgamation, their counterparts in the Northern province believed that it 
was injurious to them. 
  Indeed, these differential attitudes signaled that a Federal system 
might be a suitable framework for keeping Nigeria as a single political 
entity. Subsequently political developments confirmed the Federal solution 
as the best political arrangement that could provide the compromises and 
assurances necessary for advancement to political unity. In an effort to 
establish a viable Federation, the British modified the constitution four 
times (1922, 1945, 1951 and 1954). The final result was a Federation of three 
regions following the splitting of Southern province in 1946 to create the 
Eastern and Western regions, which was a continuation of the Northern province. The establishment of this region was a response to fundamental 
ethnographic and cultural configuration of Nigerian society. During the run-
up to independence, the British, responding to Nigerian demands, 
transferred responsibilities to Nigerian Leaders by establishing a 
parliamentary form of government based on the British model at both the 
regional Federal Level, and holding elections for each of those bodies. 
Internal self-government was thus granted to the eastern and western 
regions in 1957, and to the Northern Region in 1959. 
  At independence, (1960) Nigeria was a multi-party democracy with a 
federal constitution. Its parliamentary system gave promise of evolution 
towards a stable pluralist political system. However, this system was soon 
undermined by the nature of political forces of the time. During this period, 
three political parties emerged to dominate Nigerian politics: The National 
Council for Nigeria and Cameroon’s (NCNC), Northern People’s Congress 
(NPC) and Action Group (AG). However, the disagreement over the 1962/63 
population census figures ruptured the Federal coalition of NCNC and the 
NPC. The conflict over the census exacerbated political tensions that had 
previously led to outbreaks of violence in the Western Region and some 
parts of Northern Region. These situations led to the first military 
intervention in January 1966. After the second coup that was a reprisal for 
the wanton killing of Easterners in Northern Nigeria, the Eastern Region 
attempted in 1967 to secede and to create an independent 1960 homeland 
(Biafra) which resulted in a 30-month civil war. In response, the Federal Military government began to create more state to outflank and break-up 
the eastern region by providing homelands for ethnic minorities of the 
region, but also to break –up the dominant bases of power in the west and 
the north. The military believed that by creating a large number of relatively 
weak states under a strong central government it could overcome the 
instability of the past. In other words, the military sought to unilaterally 
redefine the shape of Nigerian Federation into one consistent with its own 
hierarchical structure and vision. The result was the creation of multiple 
state structures. Though seemingly inconsistent with the logic of military 
rule. The military believed that elected local government would provide a 
more viable and legitimate form of government at the local level and further 
weaken the States. Few local government areas were established initially. 
But over the years the number grew astronomically. 
  During the 1970s, Nigeria evolved from a poor agricultural economy 
into a relatively rich, oil-dominated one. The economic policy orientation 
during the 1970s left the country ill prepared for the eventual collapse of oil 
prices. Public investment was concentrated in costly, and often 
inappropriate, infrastructure projects with questionable rates of returns 
and sizable recurrent cost implications, while the agricultural sector was 
largely neglected. Nigeria’s industrial policy was inward looking, with a 
heavy emphasis on protection and government controls, which bred an 
uncompetitive manufacturing sector. While attending an O.A.U summit in 
Kampala, Uganda on Tuesday 29 July 1975, General Gowon’s government was sacked after mounting opposition to his government’s in decision to 
return the country to civil rule. Gen Murtala R. Mohammed who in October 
1975 presented the nation with a well – detailed timetable to return the 
country to democratic rule replaced him. He was assassinated in a failed 
coup d’etat on Friday 13 February 1976. This automatically brought Gen 
Olusegun Obasanjo (second in command) into power. 
  Fulfilling his promise to complete his predecessor’s transition to 
civil rule program. Obasanjo handed over to a civilian government headed 
by Alhaji  Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). This 
second republic witnessed a replay of political intolerance and official 
misconduct. It was this confusion that Shagari’s government was re-
elected for a second term. However, the regime massively looked the 
treasury, mismanaged the economy and undermined the legitimacy of civil 
democratic rule by blatantly rigging the 1983 Federal elections. On 
Saturday 31st December 1983, his government was deposed and major 
General Mohammadu Buhari became the Head of State. His regime was 
criticized of high-handedness and despite its corrective posture; its radical 
policies were still Alien to Nigeria. Thus, the regime was toppled on 
Tuesday 27 August 1985 and Gen Ibrahim B. Babangida became Nigeria’s 
first military President. 
  From early 1986 through late 1989, Babangida regime laid the 
political foundation for the transition to elected government through the 
establishment of National Electoral Commission (1987), the election of a continent Assembly (1988), the approval of a new constitution (1989) and 
the establishment of two party system (1989), comprising the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republic Convention (NRC). 
Following an attempted coup in 1990, the government moved more 
aggressively to implement the more of the political reform agenda. 
Legislative elections at the state level were held in December 1991and at 
the federal level in July 1992. In the latter, the SDP won the majority in both 
the Senate and House of Representatives. The presidential elections, 
however, proved problematic of a series of presidential crises. The results 
of a series of presidential primaries were annulled in September 1992 
because of alleged irregularities and the candidates were declared 
ineligible to participate in the presidential elections. 
  Subsequently, President Babangida postponed the transition to an 
elected government and in January 1993 the formation of an interim 
government, which consisted of all-civilian Transitional Council headed by 
Chief Shonekan to handle the day-to-day affairs of government under the 
National Defense and Security Council, chaired by President Babangida. 
President elections were set for June 12, 1993 and a new government was 
schedule to assume office on August 27, 1993. In the event the elections 
were annulled after chief Abiola, a Leader of SDP had emerged as the 
apparent winner. This annulment led to domestic unrest and international 
protest. Against this background, President Babangida, the military 
leadership and the leadership of SDP and the NRC agreed to another transitional government. On August 26, 1993, armed widespread Labor 
unrest and civil strikes, president Babangida resigned as Head of State and 
commander –in – chief of the Armed forces, and chief Shonekan was sworn 
in as Head of the Interim national Government for the period through March 
31. 1994, when as elected government was scheduled to assume office. On 
November 17, 1993, the Interim National Government was outset by military 
under General Sani Abacha. All democratic institution was dissolved and 
all elected officials were removed from office. Also a new transition agenda 
was set. 
  A constitutional conference was inaugurated in Abuja in 1994 and 
another transition program opened as the constitutional conference  
closed. Between 1995 and 1997, there were reported coup attempts 
allegedly aimed at Abacha’s regime. Latter, General Abacha died on 
Monday 8 June 1998 at a time when the request for his self-succession as 
civilian president peaked. General Abdusalam Abubakar then chief of 
defense staff, became Head of state and sacked all democratic structures 
and ordered the formation of political associations. With the establishment 
of independent National Electoral commission (INEC), a new political 
timetable was released to end rule on 29 may 1999. While Alliance for 
Democracy (AD) and the All People’s Party (APP) fielded Chief Olu Falae, 
the People Democratic Party  
(APP) fielded Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as its candidates for the 
presidential seat.  However, General Olusegen Obasanjo won the keenly contested election 
and General Abdusalam Abubakar successfully handed over to retired 
General Olusegun  Aremu Obasanjo on Saturday 29 May 1999, Indeed, 
Nigerians has been going through a difficult political and economic 
transition after thirty years of military rule. Thus, the new federal 
government faces an array of complicated issues that must be overcome 
for Nigeria to be successful in its  transition to a democratic political 
system and a vibrant market economy.   Again, Obasanjo was re-elected in 
May 2003, as the new President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (though 















4A CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
   Indeed, corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary 
world. 
It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, 
leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and 
particularly hurts the poor. Many aspect of bribery and corruption include 
accepting gratification, giving or accepting gratification through agent, 
Fraudulent acquisition of property; fraudulent receipt of property. Offences 
committed through postal system, deliberate frustration of investigation, 
making false statement or returns gratification by and through agents, 
bribery of public officer; using office or position for gratification; bribery 
transactions; f alse or misleading statements to the commission and 
attempt (conspiracy) punishable as offences. 
  Corruption respects no national boundaries and it deeper poverty 
around the glebe by distorting political, economic and social life. 
Transparency inter national (TI) was born from the experience of people 
who witnessed first hand the real threat to human liver posed by 
corruption. Today, corruption at the highest levels captures headlines 
everywhere, and people are becoming aware of its disastrous 
consequences. Indeed, Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the world (world Bank, 
2003; united nations, 1999). Several factors contribute to the persistence of 
national poverty, and corruption is definitely one of them. Oil and Gas have 
brought wealth to Nigeria but these industries have historically provided 
opportunities for corruption on a massive scale. The corruption 
perceptions index (CPI) is a poll of polls, reflecting the perceptions of 
business people and country analysts, both resident and non-resident. The 
table below shows the relative performance of Nigeria's CPI (1980 –2002). 
Here, the comparisons to the results from previous years should be based 
on the country’s score, not its rank. A country’s rank can change 
suggesting that now countries enter the index and others dropout. A higher 
score suggests that respondents provided better ratings, while a lower 
score suggest that respondents revised their perception downwards. 
However, year-to-year in a country’s score can result not only from a 
changing way of a changing way of a country’s performance but also from 
a changing sample and methodology. With differing respondents and 
slightly differing methods change in a country’s score may also relate to 
the fact that different viewpoints have been collected a nd different 
questions being administered. Table 4.1 presents the CPI for 1980 – 1992. 
 
TABLE 4.1 CPI: 1980 – 1992 (RELATIVE REPORTS) 
COUNTRY  1980 –1985     score  1988 – 1992           score 
NEW ZEALAND  43; 9  41; 8 FINLAND  14; 8  88; 8 
NIGERIA (corrupt)  99; 0  63; 0 
 
In the 1996 CPI report, the rank relates to the results drawn from a number 
of surveys and reflects only the perception of business people that 
participated in these surveys. Score’ 96 relates to perceptions of the 
degree of corruption as seen by business people and a perfect 10.00 would 
be a totally corrupt-free country. Score ‘95 has to be interpreted similarly 
but fewer countries were include in the index and fewer surveys were 
drawn upon and thus the 1995 column is at best a rough comparison. 
Conclusions with regard to historical trends should be based on the 
historical data as shown below. The variance indicates different results 
from different surveys: the greater the variance, the greater were the 
differences of perceptions of a country among the surveys used. For the 
number of surveys used, 10 surveys were used and at least four surveys 
were required for a country to be included in the list. Table 4.2A presents 
the 1996 CPI while Table 4.2B presents the historical data. 
 
TABLE 4.2A CPI: 1996 [54 COUNTRY SAMPLE] 














NIGERIA  0, 69       ----  6, 37                 4 
 
TABLE 4.2B CPI: 1996 [HISTORICAL DATA] 
RANK 
‘96 





























NIGERIA  0, 69           4   0, 63           2  0, 99            2 
 
Here, a lower score indicates a worse performance whereas a higher 
indicates a perception of improvements. The tables also present two 
figures for each period. The first is the average score and the trend is the 
more reliable the higher the difference between the respective periods, the 
more surveys are available and the lower the variance 
  The 1997 CPI was an improved index when compared to the previous 
years. Its ranking system was designed so that countries that are perceived 
to be the least corrupt are given the highest scores out of ten. No country 
scored ten, but Denmark, Finland and Sweden emerged in top place with New Zealand slipping from its 1996 top scores. For another year running, 
Nigeria emerged in the lowest position and was thus perceived to be the 
most corrupt country of those analyzed for the 1997 index Table 4.3 
presents the CPI table. 
 























NIGERIA  1, 76  0, 69              4  0, 16 
  
The rank relates solely to the results drawn from a number so surveys and 
reflects only the perceptions of business people that participated in these 
surveys score 1997 and score 1996 relate to perceptions of the degree of 
which corruption is seen be business people-a perfect 10.00 would be a 
totally corruption-free country. Variance indicates differences in the values 
to the sources for the 1997 index: the greater the variance, the greater the 
differences of perceptions of a country among the sources here. The 
number of surveys used had to be at least four for a country to be included 
in the CPI.   For the 1998 CPI, the rank relates solely to the results drawn from a 
number of surveys and reflects the perceptions of business people that 
participated in these surveys. The score column relates to perceptions of 
the degree of which business people see corruption. Perfect 10.00 would 
be totally corruption-free country. Standard deviation indicates differences 
in values of the sources from the 1998 index: the greater the variance, the 
greater the differences of perceptions of the country among the sources. 
Again, the number of survey used had to be at least four for a country to be 
included in CPI. Table 4.4 presents CPU table. 
 
TABLE 4.4 CPI: 1998 [85 COUNTRY SAMPLE] 





st   (clean)  DENMARK  10.0  0.7  9 
81
st (corrupt)  NIGERIA  1.9  0.5  5 
 
The 1999 CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as 
seen be business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The surveys used refers to 
the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance seventeen 
surveys were used and at least three surveys were required for a country to 
be included into the 1999 CPI. The standard deviation indicates difference 
in the values of the sources: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources. Table 4.5 






TABLE 4.5 CPI: 1999 [99 COUNTRY SAMPLE] 
 





st  [CLEAN]  DENMARK  10.0  0.8  9 
98
th [Corrupt]  Nigeria  1.6  0.8  5 
   
The 2000 CPI score relates to the perception of the degree of corruption as 
seen by people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 
10 (high clean) and 0 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The surveys 
used refer to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s 
performance. Sixteen surveys were used and at least three surveys were 
required for a country to be included in the CPI. Table 4.6 presents the CPI 
table. 
 
TABLE 4.6 CPI: 2000 [90 COUNTRY SAMPLE]  












Nigeria  1.2  4  0.6  0.6 – 2.1 
 
The 2001 CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as 
seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges 
between 10 (high clean 0 (highly corrupt) – The survey used reflects to the 
number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. Here, a total of 
fourteen surveys were required for a country to be included in the CPI. The 
standard deviation indicates differences in the values of the sources: the 
differences of perceptions of a country among the highest and lowest 
values of the sources. Since each individual’s sources have its am sealing 
system, scores are standardized around a common mean. Table 4.7 
presents the 2001 CPI table. 
 
TABLE 4.7 C.P.I : 2001 [91 COUNTRY SAMPLE]   
 
RANK  COUNTRY  SCORE  SURVEYS USED  STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
HIGH  – 
LOW RANGE 
1




NIGERIA  1.0  4  0.9  -0.1 – 2.0 
 
The 2002 CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as 
seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupts). The surveys used refer to 
the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. Here, a total 
of fifteen surveys were used from nine independent institutions, and at 
least three surveys were required for a country to be included in CPI. The 
standard deviation indicates differences in the values of the sources: the 
greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of 
a country among the sources. The high –low range provides the highest 
and lowest values of the different sources. Table 4.8 presents the 2002 CPI 
table. 
TABLE 4.8: 2002 [102 COUNTRY SAMPLE] 
 




HIGH  –LOW 
RANGE 
1




NIGERIA  1.6  6  0.6  10.0 – 2.5  
The 2003 CPI score relates to perception of the degree of corruption as 
seen by business people, academics and risks analyst, and ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). A surveys used refers to 
the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. A total of 
seventeen surveys were used from thirteen independent institutions, and at 
least three surveys were required for a country to be included in the CPI. 
The standard deviation indicates differences in the values of the sources: 
the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of 
perceptions of a country among the sources. The High low range provides 
the highest and the lowest values of the different sources. Table 4.9 
presents the 2003 CPI table. 
 
 
Table 4.9 CPI: 2003 [133 COUNTRY SAMPLE] 
 




HIGH – LOW 
RANGE 
1




Nigeria  1.4  9  0.4  0.9 – 2.0 
 Indeed, the above corruption picture in Nigeria is highly alarming and 
consequently, we wish to trace the origin and scope of this problem. 
Corruption in public life manifested in 1950’s when the first panel of inquiry 
was set up to look into African Continental Bank (ACB) – Nnamdi Azikiwe 
Affairs. The charges were that Dr. Azikiwe abused his office by allowing 
public funds to be invested in which he (Zik) had an interest. The allegation 
proved to be a big scandal, a tour de force that led to the institution of 
Justice STRAFFORD FORSTER – SUTTON Commission of enquiry on July 
24, 1956 to investigate the above allegation. The subsequent indictment of 
DR. Azikiwe in the commission’s report (as at January 6, 1957) led him to 
transfer all his rights and interest in the bank to the Eastern Nigeria 
Government (Nwankwo 1999)  
  In 1962 Chief Obafemi Awolowo was dragged to the court of 
accountability. This led to a call or an investigation of the relationship 
between the erstwhile Awolowo government and the National investment 
and property Company, a private enterprise said to be indebted to the 
western regional government to the tune of  £7,200.00. On June 20 1962, 
the Federal government appointed a commission headed by Justice G.B. 
Coker to investigate the allegations and later the commission indicted 
Awolowo in its report. Consequently, the western regional government 
acquired all the property owned by the National Investment and property 
company.  
   In 1967, another commission of enquiry was instituted to investigate 
assets of fifteen public officers in the defunct mid –western region. At the 
conclusion of the panel’s report, all the public officers were indicated for 
corruptly enriching themselves. The panel recommended that they should 
forfeit such ill-gotten gains to the government. On the basis of growing tide 
of corruption, it was not surprising that when Major Kaura Nzeogwu and 
colleagues struck, he harped on the theme of corruption Although the text 
of the Nzeogwu – led coup, promised socio – political changes, it was not 
forthcoming because of a counter  – coup that made it a nullity. High 
voltage intrigues characterized by nights of long knives, stoking of ethics 
hatreds, primordial fears of domination and hegemony pervaded the land. 
The nation would go to war, survive the war and enter another critical stage 
of its chequered history. The genocidal war against the Republic of Biafra 
commenced. It was an era of excessive spending especially on armaments 
with which to prosecute the war. 
 
  Despite this incipient tide of corruption, it is to the discovery of oil 
that we owe the magnification of the penchant of successive Nigeria 
leadership to Loot and plunder. Foreign oil companies first discovered oil 
in the 1950’s. Before they could start pumping it, the civil war started and 
put it on hold. However, at the end of the civil war in 1970, the price of oil 
soared. A nation emerging from a painful civil war suddenly found itself 
awash with petrol  – dollars. General Yakubu Gowon’s’ tragic pronouncement that Nigeria had so much money which it did not know 
how to spend triggered a new wave of foreign invasion and corrupt 
practices.  
  By march 1974; the nation was rocked by a cement scandal. The 
federal government placed an order for two million metric tones of cement 
with various firms in the United States, Romania and USSR. The supply 
was to be made through the National supply company. However, in a 
sudden change, the ministry of Defense which 2.9 million metric tones for 
its construction projects placed an additional order for 16.23 metric tones. 
Despite the fact that the price    for a tone of cement at that time 
stood at $25 and freight $15 Nigeria paid $115 per tone. Somebody 
therefore stood to gain $75 per tone for 16.23 million tones. Consequently, 
the state instituted Justice M.B. Belgore Panel to investigate the alleged 
irregularities. The probe seriously indicted the permanent secretary of the 
Ministry of Defense and he was dismissed along with other officers. 
Surprisingly, criminal proceedings were never brought against the 
dismissed men.  
  In an atmosphere of moral and social decay, the plot to over throw 
Gowon thickened. Eventually, the coup took place on July 19, 1975. After 
consolidating his hold on power, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed set up a 
federal Assets investigation panel on September 16, 1975 to probe the 
assets of all former governors, the administrator of East Central State and 
some Federal Commissioners who served in the Gowon’s regime.    
On February 3, 1976, the panel released its report and all the governor (with 
the exception of Mobolaji Johnson and Oluwole Rotimi who were 
acquitted} were found guilty of gross abuse of office. The confiscated 
assets stood at about N10 million. 
  Towards, the dying days of 1975, a disturbing three page circular 
said to emanate from supreme Headquarters, Lagos and headed: Facts 
about Murtala’s government since Gowon’s outing on July 29, 1975, an 
opening warning to the nation broke into the domain of public discourse. 
This circular alleged that looting and plunders of national wealth through to 
be the hallmark of the Gowon era had started in earnest. They also 
deposed that the Mohammed regime was as corrupt as the sacked Gowon 
government. This accusation cast a pull on Mohammed’s regime and was 
to dog it until Col. Bukar Dimka unleashed his coup d’eat on the nation. 
 
  Indeed, the failure of Dimka’s coup proved the way for the 
emergence of Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo as Head of state. One of the 
first actions he performed on coming into power was the promulgation of 
decree No11 of 1976 (Public officers Protection Against False Accusation). 
Hence forth, corrupt government officials armed with the carte blanche 
handed over to them by Obansanjo, thought they were above the law. This 
retroactive decree to all interest and purposes was a clever plan to provide 
cover and immunity for corrupt public servants and thus deter members of the public from exposing such public figures in his regime. Critics 
therefore point out that before his death, Murtala Mohammed strongly 
disagreed with Obasanjo over his role in a N45,216,000 contract (No 13 / 
1731 for designing, construction equipping and furnishing of the 
international trade fair complex in Lagos}. Three weeks after Murtala’s 
death, and regardless of his stand on the contract, it was reviewed 
upwards by the Obasanjo regime to N95,820,000. This was further revised 
again to N116, 257,893. However, the Obasanjo regime was enmeshed in 
the scandal surrounding N 2.8 billion naira missing from the coffers of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 
 
  Consequently, first class firm of chartered accountant, coopers & 
Lybrand was commissioned in May 1978 to keep the  accounts of the 
corporation. A team of accountants and auditors worked from may 1978 to 
January 1980 to reconstruct the account and audit the 1977 and 1978 
accounts. However, one of the Nigeria’s dailies (punch) blew the whistle 
over the disappearance of 2.841 billion being proceeds from the sale of 
crude oil. The uproar it generated survived the termination of the Olusegun 
Obasanjo regime and split into the second republic government headed by 
Shehu Shagari. Responsive to the controversy that refused to abate, the 
Shagari administration instituted a probe panel headed by Justice Ayo 
Irekefe to get to the root of the scandal.   Although, the full extent of the (BCCI) involvement and contribution 
to the economic adversity of Nigeria cannot be fully accounted for; the said 
missing money was lodged with the London branch of the bank (between 
1977 and 1980). For almost three years, the men of power and influence 
appropriated the accumulated interest on the principal. When the roar 
could not be swept under the carpet, the money was returned to the coffers 
of government without interest. It was with this interest running for three 
years that BCC I and its chief backers in Nigeria used to commence 
operations in Nigeria. Deposed sultan of sokoto, Alhaji Dasuki and late 
Shehu Musa Yaradua were particularly close to BCCI banking 
conglomerate. Alhaji Dasuki was therefore made the chairman of BCC I 
Nigeria when the bubble finally burst for the bank, the Nigeria arm 
transformed over nights into African International Bank (AIB). 
  Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as the President of Nigeria on 
October 1 1979, Party Politics which climaxed in the retreat of the military 
to the barracks was married by intrigues, smear campaigns, thuggery, 
violence, and widespread rigging, Repositories of power, the teeming 
citizens were cajoled, intimated and brazenly bribed as the politicians took 
their campaign messages to the people. Indeed, the Shagari’s scorecard 
was a parchment of corruption and iniquities a shocking and sad 
commentary on h ow unpatriotic leaders would sink a nation into an 
irredeemable abyss of perdition. Between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria earned 
about N40.5 billion and squandered it. The external reserve of N2.3 billion, she inherited in 1979 was wiped out and replaced with a s taggering 
external debt of N 10.21 billion as the curtain fell on this criminally corrupt 
government. 
  The life of the shagari civilian administration was terminated on 31
st 
December 1983, paving way for Buhari/Idiagbon military administration, 
Politicians were held under the state security (Detention of persons), 
Decree 2 of 1984 and many were tried by the Recovery of Public Property 
Special Military Tribunals established by Decree 3. Some were convicted 
for various offences and duly sentenced. Specifically, justice Mohammed 
Bello Tribunal convicted 51 politicians and placed refund orders on them 
for their ill-gotten wealth. Indeed, Gowon’s profligacy in an era of oil boom 
left Nigeria with a $1.6 billion debt burden. Under the Olusegun Obasenjo 
regime, the figure jumped to $3.3 billion. Under the shehu shagari’s regime, 
the debt burden stood at $6.8 billion. However, the Buhari government 
rejected loan from the international monetary fund because of its stiff 
conditionality but spent $2.7 billion servicing the nation’s debt. 
  On August 27, 1985, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida came to power 
with a reputation for kindness and humility. As he unfolded his policies on 
the political and economic fonts, discerning observers of the nation socio-
political condition observed that Nigeria was in for a period of deceit. 
  In 1986, Babangida administration rejected the IMF bank loan but 
adopted most of the reforms contained in the package (called the structural Adjustment program). However, the transition to civil democracy kicked off 
in 1986 with the establishment of a political bureau led by Samuel Cookey. 
The majority report of the commission set 1990, as the hand over date and 
this date was later changed to 1992 and later, later 1993. The June 12, 1993 
presidential elections and chief Manhood Abiola’s comprehensive electoral 
landslide win, its annulment by babangida plunged the nation into chaos, 
anarchy and cold war. The embattled president, members of the Armed 
forces sat through hours of marathon meetings where two options: 
conduction a fresh election or setting up as interim national government 
were deliberated on However, the horse trading that went on and the failure 
of the political class to defend democracy gave birth to the interim National 
Government. At the core of Abiola’s unsuccessful ambition to realize the 
mandate are the domination of the military by the North and the 
preponderance of militicians within their ranks. 
  Indeed, the interim National Government was a grand strategy to 
pave the way for a safe exists for Ibrahim Babangida. The choice of Chief 
Ernest Shoneken to carry this burden is a sign of the arrogance of the 
ruling northern class. Under the dual regime, Nigeria’s oil was constantly 
lifted and diverted to neighboring countries without being paid for. Some of 
these shady deals had the imprimatur of foreign governments suggesting 
conspiracy at the highest level of authority. With the collapse of the 
babangida regime and knowing its disregard for the rule of law and respect 
of fundamental freedoms, and the employment of violence ad assassinations, babangida recoiled into its shell to bid for time and wait for 
an opportune time to spring back to power. 
   Unable to grasp the fast changing scenario and realignments of the 
power equation, shoneken moved into the presidential villa. On the 
international front, the British were very supportive of his government 
paving the way for his visit to Britain, the common wealth and the United 
Nations. Even as the Head of state and commander in chief of the Armed 
forces, shoneken had no control of over-Northern ethnic army, which he 
inherited from Babangida. Only General Sani Abacha, the then secretary of 
defense and the most powerful and ambitions military officer could decide 
the fate of the embattled shoneken government. With the practiced steps of 
a general who had participated in coup d’ etats three times in the nation’s 
history, he made his move. The waiting game was over. In November 1993, 
shoneken met with General Sani Abacha and other Army staff at the 
presidential villa, Aso Rock, Abuja. Abacha delivered the blow. After 
extensive consultations with members of the Armed forces, the soldiers 
have come to the painful conclusion that shoneken must go with 
immediate effect. Thus ended shoneken’s important regime after 82 days of 
drift and riots on the major streets of the nation.  
 
  In an address to the nation, he dissolved the interim National 
Assembly and the state Executive councils. Alternatively, he established a 
provisional ruling council. At the onset of the regime, Abacha set in motion a flurry of probes to keep the nation busy, while he perfected his president-
for-life project. In January 1994, this administration instituted a panel under 
the chairmanship of respected economist, DR. Pius Okigbo. The panel was 
expected to come up with practical solutions that would lead to the reform 
and reorganization of the Central Bank of Nigeria, grossly abused under 
Babangida’s regime. The panel’s report exposed the outrageous frittering 
away of $12.4 billion income from oil using the conduit of special accounts. 
Babangida ran a government, which was accountable to no one else but 
himself. Under the sub-heading Dedication and other Special Accounts, the 
panel started: “your Excellency instructed us to examine the use of the 
Dedication and other special accounts. These were established in 1988 to 
house the proceeds of the sale of crude oil dedicated to special projects 
and to receive the windfall of oil revenues from the Gulf war. Between 
September 1988 and 30
th June 1994, US $12.4 billion was been recorded in 
these accounts. That US $12.2 billion was liquidated in less than six years, 
that they were spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine high 
priority nor truly regenerative investment, that neither the president nor the 
governor accounted to anyone for these massive extra budgetary 
expenditures; that these disbursements were clandestinely undertaken 
while the country was openly reeling with a crushing external debt over 
hang. These represent, no matter the initial justification for creating the 
accounts, a gross abuse of public trust. Had these resources of US $12.4 
billion, or even only a significant portion, been paid into the external reserves, the impact on the naira/dollar exchange rate today, on the 
attitude of our external creditors, on the credibility of Nigeria and the 
environment for foreign investment would have been incalculable. We have 
recommended the immediate closure of these accounts with the 
outstanding balance of some $206 million as at 30
th June, 1994, paid into 
the external reserves”. 
 
  The Bank of credit and commerce international (BCCI)-a rogue bank 
for drug barons and money launderer’s worldwide was used as a conduit to 
siphon money out of the country. Throughout the Babangida years, the 
bank enjoyed a lucrative presence in Nigeria. BCCI: The inside story of the 
world’s most corrupt financial Empire authored by two award winning 
American Journalists, peter Truell and larry Gurwin exposed some of 
Babangida’s dirty deals with BCCI. One of the hefty deals was the $1.5 
billion oil transaction with ATTACK OIL, a subsidiary of BCCI. The book 
clamed that the general’s front men pocketed $50 million for this deal 
(Nwankwo, 1999). Again, under General Babangida, Julius Berger’s 
Construction Company hit Gold. In 1985, the construction giant’s turnover 
was a modest N 2.234 billion. Of note is the “State House” project, a cover 
for the general’s 50-room luxurious personal country home built at a 
conservative estimate of  N 1.5 billion. The full details of Babangida’s 
worldwide investments will never be known. While he is perhaps the 
richest Nigerian alive today with assets in excess of $30 billion, proxy holds mush of his holdings. After eight years of plunder and pillage, the 
effect was clear. More than 3,000 officials now have Swiss Amounts 
totaling about $90 billion and in Britain £ £75 billion (nwankwo, 1999) 
 
  The revelations of the Abacha years are a story of modern day wealth in 
which the Nigerian people were used as cannon fodders. Abacha’s extensive 
business empire is an intimidating behemoth, whose stretch is in the four corner 
of the world. Abacha was able to perpetuate one of the most comprehensive 
plunder and looting of the resources of the state in contemporary history through 
intimidation, brigand, and a plethora of conduits. At the center of his scam 
schemes is the CHAGOURI AND CHAGOURI, an international consortium owned 
by five Lebanese brothers. There substantial interest cut across oil aluminum, 
smelting, flour milling, commodity trading, fertilizer importation, and real estate. 
The company’s total assets trod at $18 billion. If was with this powerful 
conglomerate that Abacha planned and executed his fraud agenda. With the 
extensive international connections of the chagouris, the Abuja fortune was 
securely deposited in the vaults of several banks in different parts of the world. 
The Abuja corruption empire is awesome. While he and his cronies 
systematically pillaged the resources of the nation, millions of its citizens 
wallowed in scandalous poverty. General Abacha’s incorrupt fortune may never 
have been known given the secrecy and mystery surrounding such hot monies. If 
will be protected by the confidentially of banks in Europe, South and North 
America. 
  Middle East it is only through the quest by a patriotic Nigerian government and 
the humanitarian consideration of these bankers that Nigeria may recover this 
loot. If not, the over $20 billion will lie in the vaults of these banks assessable 
only to the family of Abacha. 
 
  The sudden death of General Sani Abacha, on June 8, 1998, pulled the 
nation from the brink of assured civil war and paved the way for the emergence 
of General Abdulsalami Abubakar as Head of state. A man said to be an honest 
man with a large heart; he pledged to return the nation to democratic rule in ten 
months. However, only a few weeks in power, chairman of the National 
Economic intelligence committee (NEC) Prof Aluko made a shaking disclosure to 
the effect that $50 million was missing from the nations coffers. General 
Abubakar stated that the missing amount was used to offer assistance to some 
neighboring Africa countries. The Central Banks of Nigeria (CBN) was another 
beneficiary of regime's financial profligacy. Construction of its corporate 
headquarters was awarded at the same sum of $158 million  (N15 billion). As the 
spending spree gathered momentum, ten presenters and contract inflators in and 
out of uniform celebrated the mindless milking of the nation. Notably, Gen. 
Abubakar supervised the disbursement of the dizzying sum of N19 billion during 
the world youth services championship alone. Accountable to no one in 
particular, he imposed all the contractors on the local organizing committee. He 
also supervised the hurried attempt to privatize major government companies 
and parastatals as the head of National council on privatization (NCP). The dazzling speed with which the privatization process was pursued was indicative 
of the dubious intentions of the chief promoters. Having assessed questionable 
wealth, the nation was being readied for sale to the ‘Chosen” and not necessary 
highest bidder. This process is akin to internal slavery since money stolen form 
national treasury would now be used to buy up Nigeria. Again, the service chiefs 
 
 and influence peddlers in the corridors of power hastily awarded themselves oil 
exploration blocks and oil lifting contracts. These last minute deals were 
consummated in utter negation to transparency and accountability. 
  Even in the face of a mass of evidence pointing to an extraordinary looting 
spree under the regime of Gen. Abubakar, he struggles to salvage an anti-
corruption crusade gone awry and the staggering evidence and circumstances 
made his unpopular. Three days before he left office, Abubakar signed a decree 
causing Abacha and some influential men under his administration to forfeit 
varying sums of money and property running into billion of Naira. At the end of 
this military rule, one sad conclusion is that the nation has once again been taken 
for a ride. The relay race from Babangida to Abubakar transforms into one long 
nightmare of plunder and pillage, wanton stealing and gross abuse of office. 
Foreign banks as revealed by World Bank and Published, in financial times of 
London (23 July 1999) as shown in Table 4.10.  However, the presented list is by 
no means exhaustive. 
 
 
 TABLE 4.10 CLASSIFIED LOOTING OF NIGERIA FUNDS 











1. Gen Babangida  £6.256b  $7.416  $2.00b  Dm9, 00b  N2.4635Trillion 
2. Gen Abubakar  £1.131b  $2.33b  $800b  Dm16  N 0.4938 Trillion 
3. Mike Akhigbe  £1.24b  $2.426b  $671b  Dm9,00  N 0.8059 Trillion 
4. Jerry Useni   £3.04b  $2.01b  $1.03b  Dm900m  N 0.8059 Trillion 
5. Ismaila Gowon  £1.03b  $2.00b  $1.03b  Dm700m  N 0.50176 Trillion 
6.Umaru Dikko  £4.4bb  $1.46b  $700m  Dm345m  N 0. 89465 Trillion 
7. Paul Ogwuma  £300m  $1.42b  $200m  Dm500m  N 35 Billion 
8. Sani Abacha  £5.01b  $4.09b  $800m  Dm3.01m  N 1.2107 Trillion 
9. Mohammed Abacha  £300m  $1.2b  $150m  Dm535  N 0.2107 Trillion 
10. Abdu Abacha  £700m  $1.21b  $900m  Dm417m  N 0.3384 Trillion 
11. Wada Nas  £300m  $1.32b       -  Dm300m  N 0.2374 Trillion 
12. Tom Ikimi   £400b  $1.39b  $153m  Dm371m  N 0.252553 Trillion 
13. Dan Etete  £1.12b  $1.03b  $400m  Dm1.72b  N 0.32743 Trillion 
14. Don Etiebet  £2.5b  $1.06  $700m  Dm361m  N 0.56747 Trillion 
 
            
 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
15. MAJIAL MUSTAPHA   £600M  $1.001b  -  DM210  N0.199793 Trillion 
16. BASHIRU DALHATU  £2.9B  $1.09b  $360m  DM1.66b  N 0.68895 Trillion 
17. WUSHISHI  £2.3B  $1.001b  $161m  Dm1.43b  N 0.55549 Trillion 
18. HASSAN ADAMU  £300M  $200m  $700m  -  N 0.1305  Trillion 
19. T.V DANJUMA  £1.36B  $1.02b  $300m  Dm190m  N 0.3427 Trillion 
20. ISHAYA BAMAIYI  £120M  $800m  -  -  N 94.0 Billion 
 
SOURCES: FINANCIAL TIMES OF LONDON [ 23 JULY 1999] 
 




         When General olusegun obasanjo was vying for the office of the president 
under the platform of people Democratic party (PDP) he never promised much. 
However, when obasanjo won the elections (as INEC declared but highly 
contested by opponents) and upon assumption of office (may 29,1999) he took 
some drastic steps that left Nigeria’s surpassed. For one thing nobody expected 
obasanjo to muster the courage to cast the frit stone at corruption. The well 
known looters of Nigeria’s treasury are the Nigerian military past leaders mostly 
generals with part of their look they sponsored obasanjo to victory and thus 
probing past looters amount to Disgracing these generally looks like biting the 
finger that fed one.          Barely a month into the life of the new administration, reports started making   
the rounds that some N32.5 billion that was with drawn from the central Bank in 
July 1998 was not returned to the bank .Two Abuja based newspapers published 
a letter signed by Gen Abdullah Mohammed, who requested N200 million dollars, 
75 million pounds and N500 million for sundry (expenses) purpose (The News, 
August 1999). Apparently surprised that obasanjo retained Mohammed (as chief 
of staff), his supporters dismiss the allegations as black mail, orchestrated to 
compel him to resign his position to new in the villa is that the uproar over thee 
matter is a storm in a tea up and that obasanjo’s confidence in Mohammed 
remains unaffected. And yet for a country that reportedly topped the international 
corruption chart, Obasanjo’s seeming seriousness about the issue of corruption 
in public life rekindled hope that Nigeria might be its way out of the notorious club 
of rogue nations. Firstly, he sent his anti-corruption   
Bill to the National Assembly for endorsement. This bill was entitled “A bill for a 
law to prohibit and punish Bribery and corruption of or by public officers and other 
persons (presented by the president, commander-in chief, federal Republic of 
Nigeria)—7
th JULY, 1999. Next, president Obasanjo ignited what would have 
been the fire of his anticorruption campaign via the constitution of a panel to 
review various contract awards and appointments made during the administration 
of his predecessor, Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, the panel was headed by   Chief  
Christopher kolade.  Of the over 500 national awards bestowed indiscriminately 
on some Nigerian citizens, the kolade led report pruned the number to about 13. 
However, the fear among the public is that the findings and recommendation of 
the panel may have  
gone the way of other such preview exercise in the country. 
Other than from the family of the late Head of State, General Sani 
Abacha, no effort appears directed so far towards the recovery 
of the obviously over inflated contracts during regimes. But 
what may yet shock many Nigerians and which apparently casts a serious doubt over the credibility of kolade led panel and on 
the moral platform on which the Obasanjo administration would 
prosecute any culprit that may emerge from the Kolade panels 
findings is the that fact that some of the panel members that 
worked with kolade have incriminating question marks dangling 
over their heads.  
  Again, an interim management committee of the petroleum trust fund 
(IMC-PTF) was setup by president Olusegun Obasanjo to wind down the 
activities of the organization. Newswatch gathered that the sum of N500m was 
put in a bank by the erstwhile management led by Muhammadu Buhari, but when 
the IMC-PTF took over the operations of the body, it discovered that the money 
had been withdraw by unidentified persons. Both the bank and Buhari were 
dragged before president Obasanjo who insisted that the money must be 
recovered. The committee was also asking questions about several contracts 
worth N207 billion awarded by PTF under Buhari. It was also raising serious 
doubts over different payment totaling N135.59 billion made by the fund for 
various projects, leaving a debt burden of more than N70 billion owed numerous 
contractors, consultants, manufactures, publishers and supplies who are waging 
a big war against the IMC-PTF. IMC is also alleging serious contractual anomaly 
in the N800 million PTF staff housing estate; importation of expired drugs 
especially the N28 billion HIV/AIDS screening and confirmation kits as well as the 
mysterious disappearance of the N500 million (N   The missing money, in fact, exposed the laid of “Unholy” business 
relationship that existed between PTF of the Buhari era and APC (Afri- project 
consortium) led by late salihijo Ahmad (Adamawa State). The committee 
asserted that the APC consultants virtually managed PTF. In other words, the 
PTF in its operation was not functioning as a government agency in the real 
sense. APC was actually the real PTF and yet it way a private company. It was 
also gathered that PTF had about 620 consultancy firms reported to APC, which 
had the sole responsibility for the issuance of certificate for payment by PTF. As 
a confirmation that APC was really making payments on behalf of PTF, an 
investigation showed that in 1995, PTF lodged N1 billion in commercial Bank 
credit lynonais, marina branch, Lagos and it was APC official who made 
withdrawals from the account for various payments. By the end of 1997, only 
N200 million was remaining in the account. As a result of Buhari’s alleged poor 
handling of PTF projects, and finances some PTF officials believe that the N135 
billion that was disbursed out of the PTF’s total income of N946 billion was 
squandered. 
  However, Adamu and his IMC were also accused of corruption. Each 
member of the committee received a furniture allowance of N5 million. Some 
officials were also accused of extorting money from contractors and consultants 
before they are paid their claims. In fact, only persons who are able to pay the 
buses are paid their claims.  
  Perhaps what confounds Nigerians most is the Federal Government's 
apparent unwillingness to probe Babangida's tenure as head of state. Clear indications that Obasanjo may not have the political will to probe IBB emanate 
from the president himself via Radio France international On February 14,2000. 
The president, who was on a visit to France, while affirming his government’s 
determination to probe public officers believed to have stashed the nations 
wealth away in foreign Banks, threw a surprising challenge at Nigerians. He 
specifically asked those clamoring for IBB's trial to supply proof of the former 
military president’s loot. “If anybody knows where Babangida money is Let them 
give me the particulars and see; people are just being malicious let then give us 
evidence that this is Babangida’s money “ (This week, April 17, 2000)  
  Indeed, President Olusegun Obasanjo’s search for evidence of corruption against 
Gen. Ibrahim Babangida yields a staggering result from as unexpected quarter. Nigeria’s 
London- based sports ambassador John Fashanu, blows the whistle on IBB $6 billion 
debt buy- back scam. Fashanu recently put the lid on three- year investigation into a $6 
billion debt buy-back seem perpetrated between 1988 and 1993, a period during which 
IBB was in control of government. Fashanu stumbled on the fraud in 1997 and since then 
a lot of information began to come out; it got bigger and bigger until they were looking at 
a fraud of a t least $6 billion involving 200 separate bank accounts. By conducting 
sponsored investigation he found and Africa confidential, confirmed that Nigeria bought 
back its debt in a top-secret operation that was technically illegal. Some $4.4 billion and 
there scheme cost only $2.5 billion an there are no records other buy- back or  
 
 currency stabilization operations in that period (1988-1993). This operation 
was said to have been coordinated by the former Governor of central Bank, late Abdulkadir Ahmed. Further revelations were that two close associates 
of IBB, Jeffrey Schmidt and Robert Minton, both American, operated the 
offshore companies used in the scheme. The Americans reportedly used a 
London- based company, Growth Management Limited, GML, for the 
purchase of the debts, a translation for which the Nigerian government 
deposited money into an Austrian Bank, Osterreichische Landesbank that, 
in turn, passed the credit to GML. Finding of the buy tacks was provided 
either by the central Bank or the Nigerian National petroleum corporation 
through three banks, namely the federal reserve bank of New York; Morgan 
Guaranty in New York or the bank of international settlements in 
Switzerland. Therefore, the funds were routed into various Swiss and 
Austrian bank accounts through Greenland Holdings incorporated in 
panama. Fashanu admitted having details of account numbers identities of 
those involved, dates and times these frauds were perpetrated; adding that 
the chain runs form Liechtenstein to Austria Switzerland and USA. 
Essentially the fashanu report painstakingly compiled cover a three year 
period has been turned over to the federal Government with the aim of 
recovering a sizeable amount of an estimated $17 billion of Nigerian’s hard 
earned money illegally stashed in European banks. 
  While the previous military governments systematically overtime 
milked the economy, dry the economy and killed moral in the public 
services Gen Abubakar (specifically) spent the last five month of his tenure 
decapitating the country. The Christopher Kolade panel, in its 300 –page final report, reviewed 4072 contracts, 575 license, 807 appointments, 768 
awards and 111 approvals. It observed a public service in which standards 
have collapsed and discipline was almost completely banished from the 
system. There was a widespread failure to follow laid down guidelines and 
procedure. Most of the expenditures on the project during the period were 
extra –budgetary and the bulk of projects in rolling plans were not always 
the ones eventually executed in annual budgets. Again the report pointed 
out that the basic principles of planning accountability and transparency 
were violated in most of the contracts awarded during the period. 
  The former minister of federal capital Territory (Jerry Useni) was also 
tried in Abuja by the code of conduct bureau for failure to declare his 
assets while in office. He was also linked to a new failed contracts scan 
totaling about N70 billion. The scam uncovered in 20 federal government 
projects by the Iguda Inuwa led 13 – man commission of enquiry into failed 
or non performing contracts in Abuja also involves two other former 
ministers in the regime of late Abacha. An interim report which the 
committee submitted to Obasanjo showed that the over N70 billion naira 
loss by Nigeria came through spurious contracts deals involving 
construction, supplies and services for the 20 federal government 
establishments in Abuja which the panel investigated. The commission 
indicted Useni over N58, 608, 627 million contract he awarded to New 
Hamlets limited to furnish the Supreme Court complex in Abuja. The 
commission’s findings showed that Useni directly awarded the contract without recourse to the normal tender process. Irregular contract deals 
were also discovered in the N235, 810, 63 million contract for the          
Constitution of the Abuja head office building of the National planning 
commission (NPC).  
    After examining the performance of each of the 20 projects it inspected 
in Abuja, the INUWA COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY    
has an explanation for why the projects either failed or failed to perform. 
One of the reasons was that most of the abandoned projects were 
embarked upon without sustainable funding sources to ensure timely 
completion and some project designs were over ambitious and beyond the 
needs of the beneficiaries. Again, thoughts were not given for maintenance 
of the structures in planning, specification and Execution of the projects 
and they cited pour accountability and supervision as the bone of most of 
the projects. Federal government’s reaction to the issues raised by the 
inuwa commission of inquiry is being awaited. If Obasanjo accepts the 
recommendations go ahead to implement them, it would compound   
problems faced by former official of government who were recommended 
of reprimand (News watch July 17 2000).   
     ln pursuant of the statutory functions of the office of the Accountant 
General of the federation, a team of inspectorate officers was mandated 
vide letter of introduction Ref  No.insp 0089/s.701/1  701/1, dated 19 may 
2000, to carry out an in depth inspection of the books of accounts of the 
National Assembly Abuja. The inspection was carried out between 23 and 25 may 2000 by the Deputy Director and senior accountant. The inspection 
covers the period of January 1999 to may and it was a routine inspection. 
The team in carrying out its assignment conducted a thorough review of 
the accounting records and books of the National Assembly that were 
made available to them from January 1999 to 23 may 2000. They also 
obtained some explanation from some of the schedule officer. The review 
were made using the extant rules and regulation as bench mark. In almost 
all the contracts reviewed, the national Assembly did not comply with the 
promotion for the operation guidelines on Tenders Board procedures and 
powers of spending. All the contracts were awarded based on anticipatory 
approval with 50 per cent – 70 percent mobilization fee/advance payment 
paid to the contractors without bank guarantee or performance board. In 
addition, of the contracts was opened for open tenders procedure. All were 
bused on selective tendering and accountability. Also, in the course of 
their inspection, the team discovered its vote up to the time of N421, 866 
819.45 as a t 23 May 2000. Some of these liabilities were brought from 1999 
and it total N421 million. In addition to these liabilities the National 
Assembly has also taken over-draft facilities of about N550, 000,000 as at 
23 May 2000. However, it is pertinent to note that the committee did not 
have enough time to undertake the exercise, as two working days were not 
sufficient for a comprehensive inspection exercise of this nature. 
  The IDRIS KUTA PANEL Terms of reference include: to determine the number of contracts awarded 
by the senate in the past on year form 11
th June 1999 to 17
th July, 2000 and 
to identify the officers of the senate and other senators that participated in 
the exercise of contract awards. 
  Available records showed that a total number of about 91 contracts 
were awarded by the senate during the period under reference. This finding 
also clearly revealed that most senators participated in the award of 
contracts between 4
th June 1999 and 17
th July 2000. The third reference way 
to identify to whom the contracts were awarded, for what and the amounts 
involved. It was very clear form the submissions of both senator Gbenga 
Aluko and the Director of budget, planning, research and statistics that the 
defunct senator services committee under the chairmanship of senator A.T. 
Ahmed agreed to share certain contracts amount the principal officers and 
members of the defunct committee. Form the discussions between the 
defunct senate services committee and the director of Budget, research, 
planning and statistics the contracts were shared accordingly. 
  However, before the sharing could be effected a new senate 
Lordship emerged. 
  The fourth terms of reference is to determine whether laid Dan Rules 
and procedure were complied with in the Award of contract. Individual 
there are laid down rules and procedure of the award of contracts, which 
have been in existence in the National Assembly since the second 
Republic. The rules and procedure were reproduced and sent to all the principal officers senators and Honorable member by the clerk of the 
National Assembly under reference NASS/810/1/T.I/34. On the whole laid 
down rules and procedures were not complied with in the award of all the 
recognized contracts in the National Assembly. The CNA (clerk) of National 
Assembly in his evidence stated that he advised the senate president of the 
need to avoid Abuse of “anticipatory approval” which he said must be 
restricted to emergency situation only. 
  He award of contracts as these functions were taken over by the 
principal officers. Here contracts were awarded, executed and fully paid 
without the necessary contract documents. The National Assembly also 
becomes a place where people could make money without doing anything. 
The decision to give to the sum of N39, 900,000 as Christmas welfare 
package to the senate president and his Deputy was taken on 21
st 
December1999. 
  The fifth term of reference was to determine the position of the 
contracts- whether satisfactory completed or still in the process of being 
completed some of the contracts awarded and which were fully paid for 
were not executed or were abandoned completely form the ministers of the 
Body of principal officers meeting of 21
st June 2000, some principal officers 
observed that contractors did not execute their contracts after full 
payments were made. Yet nothing was done by the management of the 
National Assembly to get those contractors to compete their projects. 
  The Eight term of reference was to examine any other issue  Relevant or incidental to the investigation form the, it was very clear that 
contracts were inflated and this was made possible by the technique of 
selective tendering, where contractor of choice were selected from 
contracts awards. Also the system of market survey where reasonable and 
appropriate price could b determined was neglected. Thus the use of 
anticipatory approvals in the award of contracts give rise to abuse and 
thereby encouraged fraud- the management of the National Assembly, 
particularly as it relates to the senate has not been as transparent, prudent 
and accountable as is to be expected. These shortcoming all emitted from 
the disregard of laid down procedure and rules by the leadership of the 
National Assembly, in particular, the senate and management 
consequently, the committee recommended that the police and other 
appropriate security agencies should be invited to investigate the issues 
highlighted on their report such as the loss of official vehicles and the 
manner in which unregistered companies got their cheque payments 
honored, since they could not legally operate bank accounts in the names 
of these companies.                      
  Unbelievably, in the sixteen months of the Obasanjo presidency, he 
made about 45 foreign trips that have taken him to 25 countries cutting 
across the continent of Africa, Asia, America and Europe. In one major trip 
he embarked on, in September 2000, Obasanjo was out of the country for 
all of 14 days and yet he was not on vacation. Sometimes about thirty 
Nigerians accompany Obasanjo on each of such trips. On his part the president is entitled to $3,000 (N300, 000) per night, accompanying 
government get $1,000 each per night while the ministers and other senior 
aides get about $500 each night. Junior aides and members of the press 
get $250 estacode per night. In February 2000 the presidency had written to 
the senate asking it for an additional N1,013,773,560 to meat the overseas 
travel needs of both the president and his deputy. There was also a request 
of N270 million as hospitality and entertainment allowance for both the first 
and second citizens in the year 2000. In making the request, president had 
pleaded that the N486,266, 440 and the N230 million provided for him and 
his deputy were grossly inadequate. But beyond the public angst over the 
frequency of these trips, Observers have raid queries over the benefits of 
such travels. 
  Indeed, the federal Audit report of the federal ministries and 
parastatals was made public for the first time ever by Vincent Azie, the 
ACTING AUDITOR- GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION. This audit report 
revealed that more than N23 billion was lost in 10 major ministries in one 
year (2001). The amount represents financial frauds ranging from 
embezzlement payments for jobs not done, over-involving double debiting, 
and inflation of contract figures to release of money without the consent of 
the appointment approving authority (Newswatch feb.24, 2003). Top on the 
list of corrupt ministries (2001) was that of competition and integration in 
Africa with about N10.453 billion unaccounted for during the financial audit.  
A breakdown of the level of misappropriation is shown in table 4.11 below.  TABLE 4.11 MISAPPROPRIATED FUNDS BY MINISTRIES (2001)                 
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  Details of the audit report revealed all sorts of financial frauds 
imaginable. For instance, at the federal ministry of works and housing the 
report observed that cheques of the ministry totaling N1.088 million were 
debited twice by the central Bank of Nigeria for the ministry of finance, the 
report revealed that 12 payment vouchers with individual values exceeding 
N5 million and totaling N105.926 million were raised and paid between Nov. 
16 and Dec. 28, 2001 as final payments without the representative of the 
auditor general co-signing the certificates of completion contrary to financial guidelines. Again the audit examination of revenue records at the 
Tin- Can Island port, Lagos Nigeria revealed that between July and 
September 2001, amounts totaling N134. 769 million collected by some 
designated banks were not remitted into the coffers of Central Bank of 
Nigeria. 
  Azie’s report also frowned at the financial records of the National 
Assembly. For example, his report stated that N1,520 million was paid to a 
member of the house of Representatives on payment voucher number 2030 
of February 7,2001 as refund of out- of – pocket expenses incurred on 
foreign medical treatment. The report fund out that only N4400, 000 was 
approved on the advice of the chief medical officer of the National 
Assembly, who observed that there was no referral from the National 
Assembly clinic or any government hospital before undergoing treatment 
abroad. 
  Indeed, Obasanjo’s first reaction to the report was that of 
indignation. He immediately issue a directive to all the ministries found 
guilty found of financial fraud by the report to provide answers to the 
public Accounts committee of the National Assembly. The directive was 
issued after the federal executive council meeting. Basically, the audit 
report would have been a boost for president Obasanjo’s campaign for 
transparency and accountability, but rather unfortunately, these ministers 
did not see it that way. In fact, the ministers reduced the entire report to the 
machinations of Obasanjo’s political opponents. Specifically, Prof Gana (Information minister said that the report was clearly targeted at 
embarrassing the federal government and went on to dismiss it, saying that 
the auditor general did not follow professional procedure in presenting the 
report therefore, he described the report as rash. 
  Barely 24 hours after she was sworn in by president Obasanjo’s as 
Nigeria new ministers of finance, DR. Okonjo- Iweala has resigned her 
appointment (The Sunday Sun July 20, 2003). This resignation was as a 
result of her sharp disagreement with the leadership style of Obasanjo 
government. Apart from the removal of the Budgeting function to the 
presidency, the minister was (4.65) not comfortable with the level of 
transparency in the system. She was particularly uncomfortable with the 
clearing regime t Nigerian ports. For instance, the regime compelled textile 
dealers in both the North an Eastern parts of the country to abandon the 
Kano airport and Calabar and Port Harcourt ports for Lagos (where 
government decreed that all imported textiles must be cleared). 
  Indeed her resignation action threw to entire presidency into panic 
as top Government functionaries appointed pressure on her to resumed 
her decision. 
  Similarly in August 2003, the Revenue mobilization, Allocation and 
fiscal commission (RMAFC) called on the nation to ask the presidency 
about what happened to N35 billion meant for local governments monthly. 
It also repeated its allegations that several billion naira of oil revenue were 
missing from the federation Account. In fact, the chairman of RMAFC (engineer Tukur) who had in 2002 alleged that N350 billion oil revenue was 
missing told the senate president and other principal officers that the N35 
billion meant for local government was regularly collected, but the money 
was not getting to the intended beneficiaries. Tukur also restated his 
allegations over oil revenue, which the Nigerian national petroleum 
corporation (NNPC) is illegally holding unto. Only NNPC can tell the nation 
how much we are earning. What they are doing is unconstitutional. NNPC 
is a parastatal of the federal government and the oil money belongs to the 
federation. That the federal government is controlling that federation 
Account is wrong and unconstitutional. The commission also accused 
Obasanjo of breaching the constitution by his refusal to submit the 
Revenue According bill to the National Assembly. In fact, the constitution 
empowers the commission to prepare revenue allocation bill while the 
president is to submit it to the Legislature without amendment 
unfortunately the president was withholding such bill and refused to 
submit it to the legislature. Also in November 2003, there was a change of 
guards at the Nigerian National petroleum corporation, the epicenter of the 
economy, and that raised fresh crisis of confidence and the direction of 
president Olusegun Obasanjo’s anti-corruption compaign.     
  Right now, Nigeria is broke. Years of accumulated bad habits 
reckless governments and outright looting of the country’s treasury 
continue to sink the nation further into the abyss of poverty and huge 
debts. With external debts totaling $31 million and domestic debts of about N1.16 trillion excluding contractor debts and supplier credits, the nation 
currently rank 152
nd among 175 countries in human progress and 
development. Unfortunately, Nigeria is the only oil- producing nation 
classified among the world’s poorest nation. 
  Regionally, the common fate that ties the Ibos (South east of Nigeria) 
in a bond with their Niger Delta (South South of Nigeria) neighbors is power 
oppression. Where as the Ibos were massacred before and during the Civil 
war for daring to say no oppression, the Niger Deltan were and are still 
being massacred for asking for a fair share for the proceeds of oil from 
their own land. It is therefore not surprising that Ibos in Diaspora have 
issued a “calm down” message to Ibos within the Nigeria territory in the 
struggle to actualize the state of Biafra. Under the leadership of the Biafra 
foundation based in the United States, this statement was made at the 
International conference on Ibos held on 18
th October 2003 at Ivy lane, 
Green belt Mary land, United States of America. Here, one of the key 
resolutions of the conference was that Biafrans within should do everything 
to pursue the re-actualization process in a non-violent manner. That is, 
they concluded that Nigeria has expired. To validate their claim, the 
movement for  actualization of the Sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) has 
recently threatened to form a government in exile by April 18, 2004 if the Federal 
Government of Nigeria does not convey a Sovereign National Conference. 
However, at a meeting in Enugu (Thisday Newspaper, March 28, 2004) the 
South-East  governors expressed a new resolve to produce Nigeria's next President from the Zone come 2007. Against the background of such failed 
projects in the past, one examines the substance of the latest group's expression 
of intent. In the face of Cold Northern calculations to retake political power in 
2007. And speculations of President Olusegun Obasanjo's unknown agenda, 
Ndigbo may again suffer the pains of another botched dream or endless 
humiliation and intimidation. 
  More recently (insider weekly, April 5, 2004) one of the Military Officers 
with a rank of a Major had questioned the sincerity of Obasanjo anti-corruption 
crusade. He said, "Sir, we are very much aware of your fight against corruption 
and like a good leader, one had thought that this crusade should start from the 
Presidency. But it appears not to be so. Under your eyes, your Vice President, 
Atiku Abubakar is busy buying up all public parastatals under the name of 
privatization and nothing is being done about it. Why?" President Obasanjo 
answered, "if you have any evidence about what you are saying, bring it to me 
and I will surely act on it". Indeed privatization as a major Government socio-
economic policy started during the regime of Military President, General Ibrahim 
babangida (IBB) in 1985. IBB then, created the Technical Committee for 
Privatization and commercialization (TCPC) under the leadership of late Hamza 
Zayyad. The whole idea was to superintend over the divestment of government 
interests in specified companies and the commercialization of others considered 
too critical to be handed over wholesale to private operators. According to 
experts, Zayyad between 1985 and 1993 handled the exercise with such finesse 
that the pain and acrimony usually generated by privatization exercise worldwide were virtually absent". And yet, on July 20, 1999, while inaugurating the Atiku 
Abubakar led National Council on Privatization (NCP) President Obasanjo 
painted a horrifying picture of how successive government in the country have 
invested well over N800 billion in Federal Government owned parastatals, with 
peltry return on investments. But how come Obasanjo's exercise has ran into 
buying most of the privatized enterprises? What happened to the billions of naira 
(approximately N200 billion) realized from privatization so far? Can Obasanjo 
stop his deputy as advised by the Military? These are the questions the Senate 
and President Obasanjo would have to answer urgently in the interest of 
transparency accountability and openness. 
   In line with the recent decision to probe the alleged missing monies 
realized from the privatization exercise, Deputy Senate President (on Tuesday 
March 23, 2004) announced the composition of the membership of the ad-hoc 
committee that will carry out the investigations. The committee (headed by 
Senator John Azuta Mbaka) which has six weeks to submit its report, is expected 
to determine the total number of privatized enterprises since the exercise started, 
the total amount of money generated as well as the where about of such monies. 
However, the Vice President and El-Rufai (Current Minister of Federal Capital 
Territory) says their hands are clean and therefore do not entertain any fear 
about the probe. Specifically, El-Rufai said that the planned probe was targeted 
as retaliation for the allegation of bribery he made in 2003 against some big 
shots in the Senate. He was surely referring to Ibrahim Manty and Jonathan 
Zwigina, Deputy Senate President and Deputy Senate Leader respectively, Whom the minister had accused of demanding a N54 million  bribe from him to 
speed up his smooth clearance as a minister. Whatever and counter allegations, 
is a very dangerous signal to the Nigerian economy. 
  In conclusion, we are said to report the identified high level income 
disparity in Nigeria as supported by the Federal Government and United Nations 
Development Programme. The crux of the matter is that the two ministers are 
paid their salaries in Dollar and that they earn far higher than what other average 
Nigerian workers are earning. Dr. (Mrs.) Okonjo-Iweala for instance, earns N3 
million every month, while Ambassador Adeniji collects N1.7 million monthly 
while other ministers (and average Nigerian workers) are paid far less than these 
amount. Thus, the Obasanjo administration should be blamed for its fragrant 
disrespect fort the constitution and the certain political, Public and Judicial Office 
Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Act no. 6 of 2002, which stipulates that 
the yearly salary of every minister is N794.085.00 
 
4B ELECTORAL AND JUDICIAL FRAUD 
  In one of his articles, Wole Soyinka revisited what we can call the 
last days of Sani Abacha. June 8, 1998 was the culmination of a 
progression in death of the tyrant, which started I June 1993, where he 
ordered his troops to shoot to death hundreds of innocent Nigerians who 
protested the criminal annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election. 
Thus Abacha's end began from the moment when Nigerians finally came to a realization, not only that his morbid ambition to perpetuate himself as the 
country’s head of state could be stopped but hat he must be stopped (Odey 
2003). 
  Unfortunately, one of the greatest problems of Nigeria is that the 
leaders fail repeatedly to learn any lesson form history as a result of greed 
for material wealth and lust for power. Therefore, one cannot understand 
why the incumbent president (Obasanjo) could descend so low as to 
mastermind the April 12 and 19, 2003 travesty that turned the nascent 
journeying into a hollow ritual. Apart from the ravages of the Nigerian Civil 
war, Nigeria never has it so bad in her history. In fact Obasanjo and his 
disciples aggravated the Nation’s problem by throwing out those that were 
voted for and imposing those that they want to rule by hook and by crook. 
  The appointed time indeed was April 12 and 19,2003. Those were the 
days when president Obasanjo and his disciples lied to the world and to 
Nigerians by telling us that there would be a democratic election instead of telling 
us that there would be the peoples Democratic Party convention, which is what 
actually took place. These were no election on those two days.  
  Rather, it was a day PDP members and their thugs rounded up all those 
who do not belong to their party and sent all of them packing to the valley of 
grumbling. Until this political   perfidy is resolved, Nigeria may not become in the 
democratic and good peoples may continues to during suffer for many years to 
come. However, on April 22, 2003 the independent National Electoral 
commission (INEC) declared president Obasanjo the winner of the April 19 presidential election. Clear Observations should that the elections were  not 
transparent. They were neither nor fair, Here people were not allowed to make 
their choice and where they insisted on making their choice their wishes were not 
respected as the INEC officials announced other persons for whom the people 
did not vote as winners. 
  As independent observes, we are grateful to the European Union Election 
observation mission for their Nigeria. They were in Nigeria during the elections   
and they filed their report on what they observed in the few paces they were 
allowed to go during elections. According to this group, they observed that our 
election were a complete show and organized fraud. It was neither transparent, 
free, fair nor peaceful. 
  The observed case studies include Anambra, Benue, Edo, Kastina, Kogi, 
Nasarawa, Cross River, Delta, Imo, Kaduna, and River State. Witnesses include 
stuffing of ballot boxes, forgery of results, falsification of result sheets and 
snatching of ballot boxes. The international observers headed by Dr. Oscar 
Lebner, Dr. Max Van Den Berg and Dr. Heins Jocker, made it very clear that their 
report was far form being exhaustive of the shocking election malpractice that 
took place in Nigeria where Obasanjo is presiding. What they said about the so-
called elections casts a very dark shadow on our country. Thus for this country to 
live in peace, majority of Nigerian’s believe that the so-called April 2003 election 
s must be cancelled from the beginning till the end and a fresh date be fixed for 
the elections (Odey 2003).   According to the 1999 constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, the 
judicial powers of the federation shall be rested in the courts being established 
for the federation. These courts refers to the supreme court of Nigeria; the court 
of appeal the federal High court; the high court of the federal capital territory; a 
sharia court of appeal of a state; the  customary court of appeal of the federal 
capital territory, Abuja; the customary court of Appeal of state; and such other 
courts as may be authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction on matters with 
respect to which the National Assembly may make laws and such other courts as 
may be authorized by land to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or an appeal 
on matters with respect to which a house of Assembly may make laws. 
  The judicial powers rested in accordance with the foregoing shall extend 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in constitution, to all  inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law, shall extend to all matters between 
persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to 
all actions and proceedings relating there to, for the determination of any question 
as to the civil rights and obligations of that person, shall not, except as otherwise 
provided by this constitution, extend to any issue or question as to whether any 
actor a mission by any authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial 
decision is in conformity with the fundamental objective and Directive principles of 
state policy and shall not as from the date when this constitution comes into force, 
extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 
15
th January 1966 for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any 
such law.   
  Victor Attah the governor of Akwa Ibom State must have thought the worst 
was over when the election petition tribunal headed by Matilda Adamu, a high 
court Judge, upheld his election for a second term in office. However, there was 
allegation and counter-allegation that the judge and tribunal members were bribed 
to give the verdict (News watch August 25  2003). Apart form this case, the National 
Judicial commission (NJC) also investigated the circumstances surrounding the 
withdrawal of three judges form the trial of those allegedly involved in the killing of 
Bola Ige, former Justice Minister and the controversial ruling of Justice Wilson 
Egbo –Egbo, ordering governor Chris Ngige of Anambra State to vacate Office. All 
these case and other have gingered the public interest had been sifting through the 
murky statements and allegation of miscarriage of justice purportedly induced by 
bribery to determine those cases.   Ime Sampson umanah, billionaire businessman’ stirred the hornet’s nest 
when he charged that Attah’s Victory was purchased. He attached the purported 
confessional statement of Adamu’s orderly with his petition to back up his claim. 
In a statement dated July 11, Peter Kasai, a police sergeant and former orderly 
to Adamu from the police headquarters in Jos, admitted that he paid a total of 
N6.4 million to two accounts at the standard Trust Bank, on behalf of his former 
boss.    
    He said he had no doubt that the money represented part of what Adamu 
was allegedly paid, like other members of the tribunal, by idong. He said in the 
statement that he was driven to Uyo by Edet, a driver attached to the tribunal, on 
June 3, 2003 where he first paid N4 million into account No 0174811801125, 
belonging to Hadiza Adamu, daughter of the tribunal chairman, at STB in two 
denominations. A sum of N3 million was in N500 notes denomination and N1million 
was in N200  notes. Kasai said he was asked to deposit another N2.4 million, all in 
N500 notes into the account of Ogaba Odioga Michael, son of Adamu, at STB, 
Calabar, on the instruction of the tribunal Chairman, June 26, 2003. Kasai insisted 
that the money was proceeds from bribe given to the judges. 
  The Presidency and the PDP hierarchy were also being fingered in the case 
of abduction of Chris Ngige, governor of Anambra state. In what looked like a most 
insensitive landmark court decision, Wilson Egbo- Egbo, federal High court judge, 
asked Ngige, to vacate his seat and hand over to okey udeh, his controversial deputy, 
Tuesday, July 15, 2003. The Judge had granted Chris Uba, Mentor of the governor 
and Eucharia Azodo, former speaker of Anambra state, an exparte order asking Ngige to vacate office because he had purportedly resigned from office. Would Egbo 
– Egbo be cleared and given a clean state? That was a matter of conjecture. But 
many Nigerians are not comfortable with the trend of things in the judiciary. They 
fear that if the situations are not arrested in time it could truncate the fledgling 
democracy. 
    The notice was relatively brief but direct. In it, Soji Oye, head, public 
relations and protocol matters of the National Judicial council (NJC) announced the 
suspension of Justice Samuel Wilson Egbo –Egbo. The action, he said was the 
outcome of the 19
th meeting of the NJC which ended on Tuesday, October 7, 2003 
and 
in the exercise of the powers of the council as enshrined in the 1999 constitution. The 
suspension Oye remarked, was with immediate effect and would remained in force 
until further notice (The source, October 27,2003). It is equally important to note 
that the National judicial council has sacked not less than 50 magistrates and judges 
dismissed or retired compulsorily in the last four years. 
  However, some peoples believe that some powerful peoples in government 
could influence the trial of omisore and other accused persons (suspected murderers 
of BOLA IGE). When president Olusegun Obasanjo met with some judges of the 
appeal court in August 4, 2003.  Members of the opposition, All Nigeria people's 
party (ANPP) and All progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) describe the meeting as 
deplorable. They said that such a meeting, coming after Abass withdrawal form the 
omisore trial by claiming pressures and threats from many quarters was too 
suggestive. But Umaru Abdullahi, Justice and president, Court of Appeal, said that the meeting of the Appeal Court Justices with Obasanjo was informed by the need 
to secure a piece of land for building a befitting Appeal Court Complex. 
  Be that as it may reports of manipulation of the Judiciary is a sensory 
concern to many Nigerians, who still believe that is it the last hope of the common 
man. But is it still? That is no doubt a billion naira question? To the best of my 
knowledge, it is not at present. There is need for intensive (extensive) Judicial 
reforms (and overhaul) in Nigeria.  
 
4C STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION 
  Between 1960 and today, a clear pattern emerged of the systematic 
plunder and pillage of resources of the states and local government in Nigeria. 
On 7
th July 1982, as interim report of the Director of Audit or the Accounts of 
Anambra state Health management Board was laid on the Table of the House 
and was thereafter referred to the public Account committee. 
  The committee viewed with all seriousness the inability of the staff of the 
Board to keep appropriate records of account and to produce final account 
statements as required by the law. An amount of N6,500.00 appeared to have 
been fraudulently paid out to a company for materials not supplied and services 
not rendered to the Board. This amount should be recovered without delay and 
appropriate disciplinary measures taken against the members of the staff who 
appeared to have been   involved in the fraudulent deal.   Again Civilian governor complained bitterly on assumption of office (in 
1999) that their military predecessors and their henchmen left behind empty 
treasuries in the states.  
  The probe panels set up by various state governors across the country 
also confirmed that indeed many states in the federation were literally looted by 
their former military administrators commissioners and contractors. 
  One case that seems of agitate the Imo state government very much is 
the stealing of N36 million given to the state to fight ecological problems by the 
federal government. By a letter dated July 15, 1998 Zubairu (military 
Administrator) authorized Orji to award contracts without tender formalities for the 
construction of 36 bore holes in the state act a cost of N1 million per bore hole.  
Orji and Zubairu claimed that 36 boreholes were constructed in different parts of 
the state. But the Ahamba committee discovered that no single borehole out of 
the 36 was sunk. Yet, Orji collected the N36million allocated for the project. 
  In Kogi state, a judicial commission of inquiry was set up by the governor 
Abubaka Audu with Henry Olusiyi as the Chairman. Accordingly, the Aniebo 
administration was characterized by financial impropriety and gross disregard for 
rules and procedure in contract awards. For instance the contract for the 
construction of the Ganaja road Housing estate, which was awarded for N197 
million, did not pass through the state tender’s board nor was it deliberated up on 
by the state executive council.  
  The committee also found that aniebo’s administration inflated a water 
supply construct by about N83 million through G.M. water Board.   In Plateau State, its panel of enquiry instituted by Joshua Chibi Dariye, to 
investigate the activities of the two former military Administrators (Habibu Idris 
and Musa Shehu) also submitted its report. The committee stated that Shaibu 
awarded contracts amounting to over N1.3 billion within the two years he spent in 
the state; and yet most of the contracts were not executed. The committee found 
that in one instance, N285.6 million was earmarked for the supply of various 
items. N241.3 million was paid out form the amount, and yet most of the items 
were not supplied. The committee also found that another N121.7 million was set 
aside for the renovation of government existing facilities. The contractors were 
paid N72.6 million yet most of the jobs had not taken off when the civilian regime 
took over in May 1999 (Newswatch 7, 2000). 
  Government Boni Haruna of Adamawa State is equally scandalized by the 
looting of his state by the past administration. Haruna noted that his 
administration inherited only N44.5 million as against a debt profile of N1.08 
billion. 
  Of this amount N405 million was for workers salaries while N357 million 
was debt owed local contractor. The governor who inherited a work force of 
24,000 with an average salary bill of N211 million monthly described the 
workforce as excessive arguing that government needed only 10,000 workers. 
      In Ondo State, Four past military administrations of the state namely Mike 
Torey, Ahmed usman, Anthony Onyeamgbulem and Moses Fasanya may have 
been asked too refund some money over the N24 million contract given to him supply Rosco patcher equipment to the ministry of works. The equipment was 
said to be nor functional when it was supplied to the ministry. 
     And still in Anambra State, the first report of the contract review committee 
revealed that the state was rubbed of N4 billion through unexecuted contracts. 
The committee indicted many contractors including Swift Engineering services 
owned by S.M.O. Nnoruka. Swift Engineering got the contract for the 
construction of the parade ground and cenotaph (phase I) in Awka at a cost of 
N6,915, 012.50. The company collected a mobilization free of N2,074, 503.70 
and an interim payment of N3,571 215.00 for which no work was done for the 
paid site. 
  Indeed, the question of what the 36 states governors have done, in the 
last four years with the billions of naira they collected, as the revenue of their 
state Government is one that refused to be swept under the political carpet of the 
country. The national criminal misappropriation of government of government 
funds with impurity, accompanied by the nation wide trampling on public 
accountability with impurity, has over the last four years, led to the rapidly 
expanding appropriation of polities by criminals, with impurity, and the creeping                    
 criminalisation of Government with equal impunity. 
   Due to the consistently high prices of crude oil in the international market, State 
Governments’ revenue has been increasing geometrically from June 1999.  This 
has, therefore placed the State governors in a very good position to effectively 
discharge their constitutional responsibilities to the electorate. But how many of 
these Governors have used this massive revenue responsibly enough goes to carry out their function satisfactory, by improving the living condition of the 
people who put then in position of responsibility? 
      
     In fact, by the end of there tenure on may 29,2003. The 26 State Governors 
had in four years collected a total sum of N1.15 trillion from just two sources in 
the Federation Account (statutory and VAT). The state Government also 
collected on behalf of the local governments when they illegally imposed their 
henchmen as caretakers, thus their total revenue profile stood at N2 trillion. 
Again the pertinent question by people is, have the Governor used this revenue 
in the interest of the peoples? 
  According to the national development report: 2000 –2001 by the UNDP, 
the impoverishment of Nigeria has vastly increased at the same times as the 
revenues collected by these governors also vastly increase. This devastating 
trend in the immiseration and worsening insecurity for almost 100 million 
Nigerians has continued in spite of the vast increase in revenue from the 
federation account. 
  On the certificate and qualification scandal of some governors; there was 
a lot of evidence form cross-river state to show that the incumbent governor, 
Donald Duke was not qualified to contest the May 19, 2003 governorship 
election. His opponents were privileged to look at his NYSC exemption certificate 
and found out that somebody who graduated in 1983 from the University with a 
law degree and did his law school as well as call to the Bar in 1984 had not done 
his NYSC which supposes to be mandatory for him at that time. Instead of NYSC, he chooses to do his masters and manage to get exemptions certificate 
seven years after. This is smart fraud (The week, August 25, 2003). 
  In 2001, the newswatch investigation showed that the council chairmen, 
no fewer than 31 from different parts of Nigeria were either under investigation, 
impeached or on suspension. Frank Bala, Baba, chairman, Sanga local 
government area of Kaduna state was sent on suspension by the state house of 
assembly. By his own account he spent N100, 145,025.03 to transform his local 
government. A break down of the expenses showed that he purchased two six- 
wheeled vehicles for N3 million fenced his own official residence with N1.5million 
and furniture his own official residence with N2.3 million. The same extra- 
budgeting spending for the release of stabilization fund was one of the undoings 
of the chairman of chikun local government. His colleagues in Igbabi council 
spent N410,000. 00 on efforts to get stabilization fund released and N1.2million 
on communication gadgets and constructed of 1.4 kilometre road for N8million. 
Kaduna South chairman was indicted because he claimed to have bought a 
Peugeot 406 saloon car for N3million for himself, spent N410,000,00 on 
stabilization fund and bought communication equipment worth N1.3 million. The 
sabon gari Chairman offence was that he ignored the accounting laws and went 
ahead to give each of his councilor N150,000.00 for their loyalty; spent N1 million 
as turning allowance for the month of August above and spent N1.5 million on 
radio communication equipment. In kwara state, Ismail Agboola, was accused of 
spending N3 million on sallah rams. He was said to have 12 personal cars, including a Mercedes Benz 230 salon car a Toyota celica car, spots car, a 4 
Runner Toyota, a Honda Accord and Six fairly used buses. 
  J.O.Ojobu lawyer and chairman of Ika local government in Delta state, 
was also in trouble for alleged financial impropriety. He was said to have 
awarded several contract amounting to several millions of naira illegally and 
fraudulently. Ojobu allegedly awarded a contract for the building of modern 
secretariat for N25million but later adjusted the contract sum to N28 million 
unilaterally. And in Cross- River state, the chairman of Akpabuyo local 
government area, Eyo Okon Eyo was also in trouble. An audit report indicted him 
for spending N1.5 million to celebrate his election as chairman of the council and 
he was asked to refund N 500,000 of the amount. Iduma Igariwey, Chairman, 
Afikpo local government, Ebonyi State, spent about seven days in detention in 
Abuja over allegations of forgery of hotel receipts to steal money from his council. 
The hotel bills were put at more than N700, 000 and that of his wife cost the 
council N360, 000. By all indications many local government chairman seem to 
have been doing pretty well for themselves at the expenses of the people who 
elected them (Newswatch, June 25, 2001). 
  A new secretariat being built at Ibi Taraba state, meant to provide 
accommodation for the smooth running of Ibi local government area, was a 
source of bitter wrangling between the chairman of the council and deputy 
Governor of Taraba State. The Chairman said that he inherited the secretariat 
complex in May 1999 and after a revaluation of the project, it was released that 
N97 million will be required to complete it. Thus he promptly released N80 million to the contractor to complete the project. However, Danboyi initiated the project 
in 1992 when he was Chairman of Ibi council and it was then valued at 
N1.2millon. But before the project could be completed the transition programme 
was trauncated and Danboyi left office.  
  Given this scenario, president Olusegun Obasanjo in his nationwide 
broadcast June 18, 2003 identified that one area of immediate attention is the 
structure of government at the third tier of government, which requires urgent 
review to incorporate an efficient and participatory framework that should 
maximize the utilization of scarce resources available to Governments. The need 
for review of the present structure of government at local government level was 
in formed by three disturbing trends: the non-performance or gross under- 
performance of the local Government, the high cost of governments and near 
prohibitive costs of electioneering campaign to individual political contestants in 
Nigeria and atomization and continual atomization of local Government council 
including impractical division of town and cities into unworkable mini-local 
Governments. 
   
 
4D BUSINESS BRIBERY                                 
          
ln Nigeria, they are commonly referred to as 419ers. But these fraudsters 
are known internationally by different derogatory names like white-collar 
animals, con artists, e-mail hucksters, spammers, tele-marketers and scam 
artists. This is obviously due to their cross border animal activities that seen to be breaking new ground almost by the minute. However, Nigeria 
remains a focal point because the global fraud now appears to be 
synonymous with the country. The Internet fraud Complaints Center (IFCC) 
2002 Internet fraud report captures the growing anxiety among concerned 
Nigerians and the International community.  One complaint that IFCC 
continues to receive in high volume is the well-known Nigeria letter fraud. 
This letter is defined as a correspondence (outlining an opportunity to 
receive non-existent government funds from alleged dignitaries and is 
designed to collect advance fees from the victims. This is sometime 
represented as pay off money required to bribe government officials. While 
other countries may be mentioned, the correspondence typically indicates  
“The Government of Nigeria” as the nation of origin. But the Americans are 
taking the crime issue seriously. In fact, they are already culling it 
terrorism. At the government circles, there also appears to be a new vigor 
in the struggle to save Nigeria from 419ers given the establishment of the 
Economic and financial crimes commission( EFCC). But how efficient and 
effective is the commission?   
        Tracing the vaswani brother’s business history in Nigeria and its 
attending rise the N ews magazine (25August 2003) revealed that the 
Vaswani brothers are the second generation of the vas in Nigeria. Their 
father sunderdas vaswani come into Nigeria in 1954 and established 
successful business out fit dealing in textile, manufacturing and fish 
trawling. The eldest of the brothers, Sunil took over the fathers business in 1983 and concentrated at first on fish trawling before expanding the 
business into commodities, car franchise, construction, real estates, 
manufacturing in virtually every sector of the economy. The two other 
brothers, Haresh and Mahesh later joined Sunil to complement and enrich 
his efforts.   
        For seven years, the vaswanis continued to ride the crest of their high 
connections in government until about two years ago (2001) when customs’ 
boss. Ahmed Mustapha ordered the various area commands not to compute the 
duties on the vaswani brothers imports based on their own value any more. This 
was based on the several petitions and allegations by other competitors of the 
brothers. 
  Consequently the customs impounded shiploads of rice imported by the 
Vaswani brothers for under invoicing. In all this case, the nation lost N50 billion 
that should have been paid as customs duty.  
  ASHVIM SAMTHANI (Indian born billionaire) was another bad news to the 
Nigerian Economy. Those who documented the economic crimes of Samthani 
said that he brings in rotten seafoods into the country. Usually these are 
discarded consignments that are brought in as seafood fit for consumption with 
under value custom duty. And even when the consignment is genuine Samthani 
understanding of the revenue collection system ensures that he pays too paltry 
an amount. Those who suffer from the latter pitch being the competitors whose 
imports find far cheaper items of the same quality in the market. 
 
 5.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
Following Leite and Weidmann (1999) we model the influence of natural 
resources on, and the growth effects of corruption within a neoclassical general 
equilibrium framework. In an open-economy infinite-horizon growth model, we assume 
that investment projects need administrative approval, which is granted after the firm 
pays a bribe to the government employee. Hence, corruption acts like an investment tax 
borne by firms and ultimately by all shareholders, to the benefits of government 
employees who constitute a fixed share 0 < S < I of the total population. 
Here, households earn wages and receive interest income. They purchase goods 
for consumption and save by accumulating additional assets. The current households 
head maximizes "family utility" by taking into account the well being of all his 
descendants; thus, are face with an infinite horizon maximization problem. Labeling the 
population growth rate n and normalizing the number of adults at time O to unity, the 
total adult population at time t is 
  L (t) = e
nt 
Of which Lg (t) = Se 
Agents are government employees. The subscripts g and p denote variables referring to 
the government and private sector employees respectively. And given that C(t) is total 
consumption at time t, households maximize overall utility, U, which can be represented 
as a weighted sum of all future discounted utility flows, U(c): 
t e e t c u U
pt nt ¶ =
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￿ ￿ ] ) ( [Where p > 0 is the rate of time preference 
We assume that p > n to ensure that U is bounder for constant c and that u(c) has the 
usual properties. Government employees dispose of three sources of income: Labour 
income, interest income, and bribes. Agents are competitive, i.e., they take the wage rate, 
W, and the Interest rate, r, as given and supply inelastically 1 unit of labour services per 
time unit. The bribe is a fraction  g of gross investment 
  I = k + dk 
Where d is the rate of depreciation.  
The corrupt bureaucrat is detected and punished with probability p, increasing with the 
extent of corruption, g, and the monitoring technology of the society, M, so that  
p = p   (g, m), 
with dp > 0 
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Firms produce the economy's single good g, employing a production technology 
with neoclassical properties, i.e., constant returns to scale in K and L and positive decreasing marginal products. Here, the level of technology is assumed to be 
independent of time. The production technology can be written as  
  Y = F(K,L)        (5.2) 
The firms net cash flow is defined as sale proceeds net of wage payments and 
investment costs, CI: 
  p = F(k,L) - WL - CI,       (5.3) 
Where CI equals the physical cost of investment plus the 'unavoidable' bribe 
payment, i.e., 
  CI = I[1 + g] . 
The firms objective is to maximize the present value of net cash flows between 
time O and infinity by an appropriate choice of L and I, subject to  
  K = I - dk 
And an initial value of k[o]. let r(t) be the average interest rate between times o 




In which case the firm's optimization problem can be represented by the following 
Hamiltonias: 
J = e
-F(t)t [F(K,L) - WL - I(1+r)] + v(1-dk)        (5.4) 
In (5.4) V is the shadow price associated with installed capital units of time o 
output, i.e., the present value shadow price of installed capital. The current-value 
shadow price of installed capital, q is then  
q = v/e
-r(t)t 
firms are competitive, taking w and r as given, and hence first order conditions 
are: dI = o  => FL(K,L) = f(k)-kf
-1(k) = W      (5.5) 
dL 
dI = o  => q = 1+r            (5.6) 
dL 
V = - dI => q = (r + d)q - f
1(k)        (5.7) 
      dk 
Where f(k) is the intensive form of the production function. (5.5) represents the 
usual result that the marginal product of labour equals the wage rate, and (5.6) 
shows the shadow price of installed capital exceeds unity by the extent of 
corruption. (5.7) can be rewritten to yield. 
  r = f
1(k)/q-d-q/q 
which differs from the conventional results, 
  r = f
1(k) - d by the terms in q.  
This equation for r indicates that with a given world interest rate, the steady state 
capital stock will be lower in the presence of corruption as q > 1 for r > 0 
  Next, we consider the empirical determinants of corruption and its effects 
on growth. The two key propositions from the above theoretical model are that 
corruption takes the form rent seeking activities, with the level of corruption 
positively related to the incidence of high rent activities and negatively related to 
monitoring efforts, and lowers the steady state income level, thereby reducing the 
economy's growth rate. Consistent with the interest in the role of natural 
resources, we endogenze corruption within the growth regression framework of 
Sachs and Wamer (1995) with the following resultant econometric specifications: 
 
 Corruption = zq + di Natural Resources 
    + d2 Trade Openness. 
    + d3 Rule of Law 
    + d4 Political Instability 
    + eI,i + d5 DGDP  
 
 
    + &2 Corruption 
    + &3 Natural Resources 
    + e2I  
  In the corruption equation the availability of rent-seeking opportunities is 
measured by the structure of the economy (particularly endowments of natural resources 
and the degree of openness to trade; while monitoring efforts by the government are 
measured by the strength of the institutions charged with the implementation of laws 
(rule of law) and the level of political instability (the incidence of revolutions and coups). 
The set of additional conditioning variables, Z, includes the rate of economic growth, a 
measure of ethnic diversity and the ethno linguistic fractionalization index. Also, we 
intend to test the robustness of our model by the addition of a wider set of variables. 
  Indeed, economic growth, particularly rapid economic growth, entails substantial 
changes in production methods and social relationships, including changes in the 
importance of different industries,  skills and business practices. At the same time, there s 
no guarantee that the evolution of the new institutions (be they government agencies, 
GDP I X XB GDP I n i n + =
Dsocial or professional organisation or even social norms) required to either manage or 
support these changes will take place in concert with the changes themselves. 
  In the specific case of rapid economic growth brought on by oil and mineral 
discoveries, the accrual of a majority of the revenue directly to the government is liable to 
exacerbate the incidence of rent-seeking behaviour, as claimed by Kahn (1994) for the 
unique case of Nigeria. Here, we post that more labour intensive natural resources such as 
food and agricultural products would tend to generate fewer rents and be associated with 
less corruption. Given the expected differences in behaviour for the different components 
of natural resources we split the natural resources variable into its two broad components. 
Agriculture and Mining (and Quarrying) the sub-components include crop production, 
Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Coal, Crude Petroleum and Gas, Metal Ore, Quarrying and 
others, we will originally add each component as a separate variable as well as adding the 
rate of economic growth along with the different components of natural resources, in 
order to control for the effects of non resource based rapid growth. 
  Here, the rent- seeking literature suggests that the incidence of bribery is also 
likely to be associated with the extent of trade regulations, the quality of legal and 
political institutions, and the level of political instability. Ceteris paribus, we should 
expect that an economy more open to trade (a higher value for trade openness) with 
stronger institutions (a higher score for rule of law), and with a higher degree of political 
stability (a lower value for political instability) would tend to have less corruption. The 
inclusion of ethnic diversity variable is an attempt to assess whether societal divisions 
along ethnic and linguistic lines contribute to rent-seeking behaviour. It may be that the 
prevalence of strong family ties, together with a lack of national identity and the absence of accountability of government officials, lead people in positions of power to favour 
friends and relatives, at the expense of greater public good. Thus, a more ethnically 
diverse society (a higher value on the ethnic fractionalization measure) would be 
expected to have more corruption. 
  For the growth equation, out theoretical model predicts that more corruption is, 
ceteris paribus, associated with lower rates of growth and that abundance of natural 
resources tends to reduce economic growth. The set of additional conditioning variables, 
X, includes the period average for the ratio of investment to GDP, the level of trade 
openness over the periods, and the change in the terms of trade over the period. Ceteris 
Paribus, we would expect that an economy with a higher investment ratio, a more open 
trade policy, with more favorable changes in the terms of trade (higher value for terms of 
trade and facing less commodity - based export price variability / lower value for 
commodity price variability) would tend to have a higher rate of growth. 
  Yet, in the context of the neoclassical growth model, the incidence of natural 
resources is interpreted as an exogenous technology shock affecting growth through the 
aggregate production function. By raising the steady state level of income and leaving the 
economy further from its long-run target, natural resources should, Ceteris paribus, 
stimulate economic growth. However, given  the direct (Dutch disease) and 
indirect/institutional impact) effects, some of the characteristics of resource - led growth 
can induce a net negative effect on growth, even as average income increases. That is, the 
initial increase in production (and growth) may be accompanied by policy and 
institutional changes that, after sometime, leave the steady state level of income closer to 
the current level of income, thereby reducing the rate of economic growth over the medium term. Given the specification for the corruption regression, we should then be 
able to assess the strength of corruption as a transmission mechanism from natural 
resource abundance to economic growth. The data set for regression model is presented 




6.0  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The empirical determinants of corruption and its effects on growth are 
Considered in this section. The two key propositions from our theoretical model 
are that corruption takes the form of rent-seeking activities and negatively related 
to monitoring efforts, and also lower the steady state income level, thereby 
reducing the economy's growth rate. 
  In the corruption equation (COB) the availability of rent-seeking 
opportunities is measured by the structure of the economy such as the 
endowment of natural resources (KNAR) and the degree of openness to trade 
(TOP), while monitoring efforts by the government are measured by the level of 
political instability such as the incidence of revolutions and coups  (TOM). 
  In the specific case of rapid economic growth brought on by oil mineral 
discoveries (MIR) the accrual of a majority of the revenue directly to the 
government is liable to exacerbate the incidence of rent-seeking behaviour such 
as the case of Nigeria. as a corollary, we would also posit that more labor  - 
intensive natural resources such as food and agricultural products (AGR) would 
tend to generate fewer rents and be associated with less corruption. Given the 
expected differences in behaviour for the different components of natural 
resources, we split the natural resources variable into two components (mineral 
and agricultural), originally, adding each component as a separate variable. We 
also add the rate of economic growth (dGDP) along with the different 
components of natural resources, in order to control for the effects of non-resources based rapid growth. The rent-seeking literature suggests that the 
incidence of bribery is also likely to be associated with the extent of trade 
regulations and the level of political instability Ceteris Paribus we would expect 
that an economy more open to trade (TOP) and with a higher degree of political 
instability (TUM) would tend to have less corruption. 
   The Inclusion of the ethnic diversity variable is an attempt to assess 
whether societal divisions along ethnic and linguistic lines contribute to rent 
seeking behaviour. It may be that the prevalence of strong family ties together 
with a lack of national identity and the absence of accountability of government 
officials leads people in positions of power to favour friends and relative at the 
expense of the greater of the greater public good.  In other word, an ethnic group 
in power will find it easier to pass on the costs of bribe payments to other ethnic 
groups, reducing the incentive for the former to internalize the costs of corruption. 
Thus, a more ethnically diverse society would be expected to have more 
corruption. Here, the effect of bureaucratic concentration (or the degree of 
internalization of the costs of corruption) may be proxies by the  share of 
government current expenditures in Gross Domestic Product. 
  For the growth equation (DLGDP) our main variable of interest are 
corruption (COB) and Natural Resources (NAR). Here, the theoretical model 
predicts that more corruption is Ceteris Paribus associated with lower rates of 
growth while abundance of natural resources tends to reduce economic growth. 
The set of additional conditioning variables, X, includes the period average for 
the ratio of investment to GDP (IGD), the level of trade openness (ToP) over the period, and the change in the  terms of trade (TTE) over the period. Ceteris 
Paribus we would expect that an economy with a higher investment ratio, a more 
open trade policy, with more favorable changes in the terms of trade, to have a 
higher rate of growth. 
  In the context of the neoclassical growth mood, the incidence of natural 
resources is interpreted as an exogenous technology shock affecting growth 
through the aggregate production function. By raising the steady state level of 
income a nd leaving the economy further from its long-run target, natural 
resources, should ceteris paribus, stimulate economic growth. However, some of 
the characteristics of resource-led growth can induce a net negative effect on 
growth, even as average income increases. That is, the initial increase in 
production (and growth) may be accompanied by policy and institutional changes 
that, after sometime, leave the steady state level of income closer to the current 
level of income, thereby reducing that rate economic growth over the medium 
term. 
  The Results of our regression analysis are shown below: 
CORRUPTION MODEL RESULTS 
1.  CoB =   -3.4774 - 1.7751DLGDP + 0.32887LNAR 
(-5.2276)  (-3.1217)    (6.1320) 
R
2 = 0.68163  R
2 = 0.64626  F(2,18) = 19.2691 
The figures in parenthesis are T-ratios. 
 
  
2.  CoB =   - 4.3033  + 0.24017LNAR  +  0.43571ToP 
    (-4.6133)  (5.6999)      (0.93789) 
  + 0.0002TUM  + 3.4670  -  1.2707 DLGDP 
  (-1.4573)      (0.75036)   (-2.0312) 
R
2 = 0.70475  R
2 = 0.59930 F(5,14) = 6.6834. 
  The figures in parenthesis are T-ratios 
 
 
3. CoB =   -4.2402 - 0.20651 LMIR 
    (-4.5871)  (0.55285) 
    + 0.58259 LAGR  +  0.55856 ToP 
(1.4163)  (1.1487) 
-0.0002TUM - 0.03062 GCP 
(-1.25116)     (-0.0052) 
-  1.1478 DLGDP 
( - 1.7836) 
  R
2 = 0.72410   R
2 = 0.59676  F(6,13) = 5.6864 





4. CoB = -3.8151  -  0.18365    +   0.55183 LAGR 
   (-4.8320)  (-0.63971)  (1.7195) 
  - 1.5243DLGDP 
  (-2.5364) 
  R
2 = 0.70580  R
2 = 0.65388    F(3,17) = 13.5946 
  The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios 
 
 
5. DLGDP = -0.50719   -  0.12134LGDP 
    (-0.64488)  (-0.45038) 
    + 0.18955LNAR  -  0.17307 CoB 
    (0.82951)     (-2.0346) 
  R
2 0.44288   R
2 = 0.34456   F(3,17) = 4.5046 
  The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios 
 
 
6. DLGDP  = 0.16548 - 0.24431 LGDP 
    (0.10437)   (0.62700) 
    -0.19459CoB + 0.27533LNAR - 2.5744 IGD 
    (-1.9655)      (0.92004)    (-1.0075) 
    + 0.0004TE + 0.55767 ToP 
  R
2 = 0.48981   R
2 = 0.25434   F(6, 13) = 2.0801   The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios 
 
7. DLGDP =  - 0.066415  - 0.16961 LGDP 
    (-0.74460)  (-0.62180) 
    0.21693 LNAR - 1.7818 IGD 
    (0.94525)       (-1.0392) 
  R
2 = 47818  R
2 = 0.34763   F(4,16) = 3.6643 
  The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios 
 
 
8. DLGDP = 0.71883  - 0.13639 LGDP 
    (0.67411)   (-0.50777) 
    -0.14735CoB + 0.29596LMIR 
    (-1.7154)     (1.2862) 
    -0.15042LNAR  - 3.1358 IGD 
    (-0.41375)        (-1.5812) 
  R
2 = 0.52994   R
2 = 0.37325    F(5,15) = 3.3822 






9. DLGDP = 0.62804  - 0.14894 LGDP 
    (0.57811)   (-0.57405) 
    - 0.14540CoB + 0.22720LMIR 
    (-1.7059)     (1.5840) 
    -0.69472LAGR 
    (-0.37380) 
    (-1.5746) 
  R
2 =0. 52896  R
2 = 0.37195   F(5,15) = 3.3689 
 
 
  The suggested groupings are in line with the general characterization of 
mineral resources as relatively capital intensive, and agricultural resources as 
relatively labour intensive, and the obtained results are in line with earlier 
theoretical predictions. Capital (Labour) intensive natural resources industries 
tend to induce a higher (lower) level of corruption, ceteris paribus. 
  The coefficient on trade openness identifies corruption as a channel 
through which trade restrictions affect growth, consistent with the rent seeking 
literature. The obtained results suggest that countries more open to external 
trade that is with fewer trade restrictions tend to generate both substantial rents 
and rent seeking behaviour. The results also support the hypothesis that 
monitoring efforts tends to dampen corruption. Political Instability as proxied by 
turmoil and revolutions tends fosters a high level of corruption.   On a related level, we find no evidence for the predicted effect of 
bureaucratic power concentration: the robust to the addition of a variable on 
government current expenditures as a share of GDP. Again, the coefficient on 
the GDP growth rate suggests that rapid growth leads to more corruption, a 
result robust to instrumenting Long-run growth with initial income. There, the 
inference is not that a lower growth rate is somehow to be preferred but simply 
that rapid economic progress, if its beneficial effect is to be fully felt, requires 
special attention to be paid to the social and institutional fabric. Convergence 
hypothesis is confirmed by the negative coefficient on initial income, the positive 
impact of trade (absence of trade restrictions) is confirmed by the positive 
coefficient on trade openness; and positive terms of trade shocks are associated 
with higher growth. In the context of the neoclassical model, these results confirm 
that countries converge faster the farther they are from their own steady state. 
And consistent with the predictions from the Dutch disease literature, our results 
suggest that natural resource abundance tends to reduce long-run growth rate. 
  Unlike other studies, however, we find no, evidence that, ceteris paribus, 
the growth process in Nigeria, i s different from other parts of the world. In 
accordance with our theoretical model, Long-term growth id negatively affected 
by the level of corruption from the results for the corruption regression, we can 
identify three mechanisms for such a relationship: trade policy, equality of 
institutions and political stability. Operationally, the normative implication is that 
to attenuate the extent of corruption and to foster significant improvements in the 
standard of living, policy makers should focus their efforts on liberalizing the external trade regime and enhancing the quality of legal and political institutions. 
Given our finding that neither the corruption nor the growth process has specific 
country dimensions, this proposal remains as valid in Nigeria as  in any other 
region of the world. 
  Although our regression results confirms that natural resources affect 
economic growth partly through their effect on corruption. The regressions also 
reveal that the proposition on the negative effect of natural resources on growth 
remains intact (as shown below) 
NATURAL RESOURCE MODEL RESULTS 
10. LNAR = 0.58254  -  0.00607 CoB  +  0.05913 LGDP 
    (2.6717)   (-0.4872)    (1.2109) 
    + 0.4365LMIR  +   0.5094LAGR 
(18.8988)  (14.7199) 
+ 0.9763lGD    -  0.0411ToP 
  (0.24059)      (-1.3739) 
+ 0.0007TTE 
   (0.16034) 
  R
2  = 0.99   R
2 = 0.99  F(7,13) = 25533.8 





11. LNAR =   0.56068  - 0.0072656CoB 
              (-0.53343) 
    + 0.06773LGDP  +  0.43140LMIR 
(1.1428)  (14.2942) 
+ 0.51288LAGR  +  0.12689 IGD 
(13.5029)  (0.29251) 
-  0.05836ToP  +  0.0013TTE 
(-1.1728)    (0.29251) 
-  0.00729LGOL 
R
2 = 0.999    R
2 = 0.999  F(8,12)  = 20757 
The results in parenthesis are T-ratios 
 
 
12. LNAR  =  -4.3408  - 0.11629CoB 
    (-5.4988)   (-1.4562) 
    + 1.2837LGDP + 0.58169 IGD 
(20.9604)  (0.34318) 
-0.11246 ToP  -  0.00508 TTE 
  (-0.66745)         (-2.1075) 
  R
2
  =  0.9959    R
2  = 0.9946  F(5,15) = 745.8015 
The results in parenthesis are T-ratios 
  
13. LNAR  =  -4.3654  - 0.12269CoB 
      (-5.6383)  (-1.5637) 
    + 1.4187 LGDP - 0.27137 IGD 
(11.5918)  (-0.15132) 
+ 0.039605 ToP  - 0.00408 TTE 
   (0.19391)    (-1.6374) 
-  16950 LGOC 
(-1.2660)   
  R
2 = 0.99641   R
2  =  0.9948   F(6,14) = 646.7456 
 
  Although the corruption model equations confirms that natural resources 
affect economic growth partly through their effect on corruption. The regressions 
of growth model equation reveals that the proposition on the negative effect of 
natural resources on growth remains intact, even after accounting for the 
endogeneity of corruption and trade liberalization. 
  Indeed, a resource boom has often triggered as (unsustainable) increase 
in government spending, an effect particularly important in developing countries 
and in cases of fuel or ore discoveries, where the additional revenue mostly 
accrues directly to the government. to the extent that such spending  spurts 
reflect current consumption instead of investment in economically justifiable 
projects, long-run economic growth should be negatively affected, partly in the 
likely event of a down turn in commodity markets. To account for this effect, we include, as an explanatory variable, the beginning of period ratio of government 
consumption to GDP, where government consumption is defined as government 
expenditure. The results as reported above, reveal that the negative effect of 
natural resources on growth is n ow confined to the Agricultural sector with the 
conclusion robust to the inclusion of the variable on government consumption 
and to the aggregation of mineral and agricultural resources into one variable. 
  
7.0  LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK  
  The first ever-concrete step to fight corruption in Nigeria was the corrupt 
practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000. It was a bill for an act to prohibit 
and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices; and other related offences. 
However, it was latter commended as the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Bill, 2003. It was equally a bill for an act to establish a commission to 
prohibit and possible punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences 
(as enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This 
act may be cited as the corrupt practices and other Related Offences 
Commission Act, 2003. There is established a commission to be known as the 
Anti-Corruption Commission. It shall be the duty of the commission where 
reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that any person has conspired to commit 
or has attempted to commit or has committed an offence under this Act or any 
other Law prohibiting corruption, to receive and investigate any report of the 
conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or the commission of such offence and 
in appropriate cases make its recommendation for prosecution or otherwise to 
the office of the Attorney - General of the Federation or of the State. Examine the 
practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where in the opinion of 
the commission, such practices, systems or procedures aid or facilitate fraud or 
corrupts, to direct and supervise a review of them. Instruct, advice and assist any 
officer, agency or parastatals on ways by which fraud or corrupt may be 
eliminated or minimized by such officer, agency or parastatals. Advise heads of public bodies of any changes in practices, systems or procedures compatible 
with the effective discharge of the duties of the public bodies as the commission 
thinks f it to reduce the likelihood or incidence of bribery, corruption and related 
offences. Educates the public on and against bribery, corruption and related 
offenses. And enlist and foster public support in combating corruption. 
  Another related legal reform w as a bill for an act to further amend the 
banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991, as amended and for matters 
connected therewith (Act 2002). Also, was a bill for as act to amend the Money 
Laundering Act 1995 and for matters connected therewith as  enacted by the 
National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Act 2002). 
  Furthermore, there was a bill for an act to provide for the establishment of 
a commission for Anti-terrorism, economic and financial crimes and for matters 
connected therewith (as was enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, Act, 2001). The Commission shall be responsible for the 
enforcement and the due administration of the provisions of this Act; the 
investigation of all financial crimes including  advance fee fraud, money 
laundering, Counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers futures market fraud, 
fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, 
contract scan, etc; the co-ordination and enforcement of all anti-terrorism, 
economic and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any 
other person or authority; carrying out and sustaining vigorous public and 
enlightenment campaign against terrorism, economic and financial crimes within 
and outside Nigeria and carrying out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the functions conferred on it under 
this Act. 
  In December 2003, the National Assembly of Nigeria also endorsed the 
United Nations (UN) convention on transnational organized crime with the 
passage of a bill that effect. The bill, entitled "Enforcement of the Provision of the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes" was 
passage by the senate and the House of Representatives of the F ederal 
Republic of Nigeria. The bill makes it a criminal offence for any person or country 
to conceal, disguise the origin of property of any person who is involved in the 
commission of predicate offense with a view to eroding consequences of the 
crime. In article 8 entitled criminalization of corruption, the bill visits the acts that 
constitute corruption under the conviction as follows "the promise, offering or 
giving to a public official, directly or indirectly of an undue advantage for the 
official himself or herself or another person to entity in order that the official act or 
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Solicitation of 
acceptance by a public official directly or indirectly, or an undue advantage for 
the official h imself or another person on entity in order that the official act or 
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties." The bill therefore 
recommends outright seizure of proceeds of crime. 
  In the case of recovery of looted funds, the conversion under international 
Co-operation for purposes of confiscation says: "A state partly that has received 
a request from another state partly having jurisdiction over an offence covered by 
his convention for confiscation of proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in its territory, shall to the greatest extent possible 
within its domestic legal system (comply). 
  On the policy front, there is recently a reform agenda of the new 
administration put together by its economic team and tagged National Economic 
Empowerment and Development strategy (NEEDs). The bedrock of Needs is its 
vision of a Nigerian with new set of values and principles, which will facilitate the 
achievements of national goals of wealth creation, employment generation and 
poverty reduction. Specific reform programmes in the NEEDs include 
Government and institutional Reform, which entails public sector reforms, 
privatization and liberalization, governance, transparency and anti-corruption; as 
well as service delivery by government agencies. It also specifies private sector 
reform, which will address issues like security and rule of law; infrastructure; 
finance; sectoral strategies; privatization and liberalization; and trade and 
regional integration. It then drew a human Development Agenda or social 
charter, which will focus on health, education, integrated rural development, 
housing development, employment and youth development, safety nests, as well 
as geopolitical balance. NEEDS also specifies its financing and plan 
implementation strategies, and is indeed a medium-term strategy, but which 
derives from the country's long-tem goals of poverty reduction, wealth creation, 
employment generation and value re-orientation. Here, the Federal Government 
under the NEEDs and the state Government under the State Economic 
Empowerment and Development strategy (SEEDs) will coordinate a planning 
framework with agreed common primitives to agriculture, public finance/ public sector reforms with emphasis on the social sector. The core team include Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala; Charles Chukwuma Soludo; El-Rufai and Ezekwesili  - Will this 
team give Nigerians cause to stay back at home rather than risk their lives across 
the Sahara Desert in search of the good life? Or will they go down in history as 
those who also tried but failed? However, the more relevant question is: will the 
strategy lead to its stated aim of building "a solid foundation for the attainment of 
Nigeria's long term vision of becoming the Largest and strongest Africa Economy 
and a key player in the world economy'? It depends since the inhospitable 
Nigerian environment has always ensured the death of grand development plans 
even in the cradle. The most critical factor in that environment is the all-pervasive 
corruption, which the government has been unable to tame in almost five years. 
Without a leash on this rampaging minister, no reform will take off, let alone work. 
With corruption on the loose, it is nigh impossible to achieve the set targets of 
public works to open up the rural areas such as boosting agricultural productivity 
and expanding utilities. That is, besides the fact that corruption increases the 
cost of doing business and inflicts grievous distortions on the reward system that 
is so crucial to competitive capitalism. Other inhibiting factors include object lack 
of infrastructure, national insecurity, unresponsive legislative support for enabling 
laws, policy inconsistency, poor and show judicial arbitration, government's an 
fiscal indiscipline lack of regulatory capacity and integrity; and notorious lack of 
continuity in governance (This day , March 28, 2004). Perhaps NEED (SEEDs) 
may have developed a solid problem statement (mission or vision), it however 
lacks on operational analytic framework of policy formulation and implementation in a related working paper; Nwaobi (2004) has demonstrated the work of 
Nigeria's economic problem and the way out. Nwaobi (2000) also demonstrated 
proposed policy measures for revitalizing a poor developing economy. 
  At this juncture, to curb national and international corruption, there is a 
need to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat more 
effectively corruption and to promote, facilitate and support international 
cooperation to curb corruption. Quality in government demands that anti-
corruption measures be implemented worldwide to identify and deter corruption 
and all that flows from it. It is crucial to recognize the dire need for an integrated 
international approach in preventing corruption, money laundering and t o 
facilitate asset recovery. When one accept the idea that lack of opportunity and 
deterrence are major factors helping to reduce corruption, it follows that when ill-
gotten gains are difficult to hide, the level of deterrence is raised and the risk of 
corruption   is reduced. Furthermore, there is a need for a global and integrated 
approach that is evidence based, inclusive, and transparent comprehensive, non-
partisan and impact oriented approach, negotiated and accepted by the 
international community. It  has emerged clearly that national institutions cannot 
operate successfully in isolation but there is a need to create new strategic 
partnerships across all sectors and levels of government and civil society in the 
effort to build integrity to curb corruption. Abuse of power for private gain can 
only be fought successfully with an international dynamic, integrated in a poor 
country such as Nigeria.   Indeed, countless initiatives have failed in the past because of the main 
players not being sufficiently "clean to withstand the backlash that serious anti-
corruption initiatives tend to cause. Successful anti-corruption efforts must be 
based on integrity, credibility and trusted by the general public. Where there is no 
integrity in the very system designed to detect and combat corruption, the risk of 
detection and punishment to a corrupt regime will not be meaningfully increased. 
Complaints may not come forward if they perceive that reporting corrupt activity 
exposes them to personal risk. Corrupt activity flourishes in an environment 
where intimidating tactics are used to quell, or silence, the public. When the 
public perceives that its anti-corruption force cannot be trusted, the most valuable 
and efficient detection tool will cease to function. Without the necessary (real and 






8.0  CONCLUSION 
The thrust of this paper was the theoretical and empirical investigation of 
the channel through which natural resources might affect Nigeria's Economic 
growth, that is, an increase in rent-seeking activities. Specifically, the paper 
analysed two intertwined broader issues: what factors determine the incidence of 
corruption or what roles does the abundance of natural resources play: and what 
factors affect economic growth in Nigeria. 
  Our analytical model focused on four major determinants of the extent of 
corruption in an economy.  It demonstrated the corruption dampening effects of 
improvements in monitoring technology and increases in penalties, and the 
corruption - fostering effects of capital - intensive production and concentration of 
bureaucratic power. In the framework of the model, natural resource discoveries 
were interpreted as technology shocks with their extent depending on the specific 
type of commodity considered. Empirically, one of the main results was to 
confirm that capital-intensive natural resources are a major determinant of 
corruption in Nigeria.  
  Indeed, both our theoretical and empirical results stress the importance of 
strong institutions in the wake of natural resource discoveries as a mean to curb 
the associated negative growth effects of corruption. This is especially true in a 
developing economy (such as Nigeria) where natural resource discoveries have 
a much higher relative impact on the economy's capital stock and on the extent of corruption, and are confronted with generally weaker and less adaptable 
institutions. 
  Essentially, this study constitutes a first step towards an investigation of 
the effect of natural resources on corruption and growth in Nigeria.  In this 
context, it would be useful to model the government's anti-corruption policies as 
the response of an optimizing agent, which would allow, inter alias, a formal 
derivation of the need for, and the extent of, institutional and administrative 
adjustments in response to resource discoveries. The addition of a time 
dimension to our empirical analysis would also allow some understanding of the 
economic dynamics of natural resource discoveries. 
  The main conclusion of this paper is that corruption is not going to be 
curbed neither nationally or internationally unless a broad agreement is reached 
towards a more dynamic, integrated and global approach against corruption for 
this global approach to be accepted and implemented globally, there is a need 
for a strong UN convention against corruption establishing efficient international 
anti-corruption measures and implemented through strong international 
collaboration and coordination. Building integrity to curb corruption at the national 
level is an extensive and ongoing task. It requires real not merely expressed 
political will and the dedication of social and financial resources, which in turn 
only tend to materialize when the true nature and extent of the problem and the 
harm it causes to societies and populations are made apparent. Progress is 
difficult to achieve, if achieved, it is difficult to measure. The creation of popular 
expectations about standards of public service and the right to be free of corruption are important elements of an anti-corruption strategy. Yet the 
difficulties inherent in effecting progress involve careful management of and 
lining up to public expectations. Winning public trust is the key and it has to be 
earned. As soon as the UN convention against corruption has been rectified, it is 
critical that the necessary international and national political will and resources 
are being mobilized in a coordinated manner to secure a realistic implementation 
of a global evidence based, transparent, comprehensive, inclusive, non partisan 
and impact oriented approach. This is a task that must be accomplished for a 








 Appendix:  
REGRESSION DATA 
GROWTH AND CORRUPTION INDICES 
  1     2      3     4         5        6C Year  GDP at Current 
Factor cost (N 
Million) 





Invest / GDP  Trade Terms 
(exchange rate) 
US Dollar 
  GDP  CoB  D DGDP  INV  IGD  TTE 
1981  113,533.55  0.0    18,220.59    0.6309 
1982  116,407.25  0.0    17,145.82    0.6702 
1983  126,803.16  0.0    13,335.33    0.7486 
1984  130,123.22  0.0    9,149.76    0.8083 
1985  140,738.19  0.0    8,799.48    0.9996 
1986  142,520.57  0.0    11,351.46    3.3166 
1987  189,688.02  0.0    15,228.58    4.1916 
1988  243,661.88  0.0    17,562.21    5.3330 
1989  348,109.55  0.0    26,825.51    7.6500 
1990  416,863.82  0.0    40,121.31    9.0001 
1991  481,652.48  0.0    45,190.23    9.1545 
1992  788,295.98  0.0    70,809.16    19.6609 
1993  1,041,076.26  0.0    96,915.51    22.6309 
1994  1,367,397.99  0.0    105,575.49    21.8861 
1995  2,615,962.58  0.0    141,920.24    84.5750 
1996  3,549,072.87  0.0    204,047.61    70.6000 
1997  3,701,077.40  1.0    24,899.79    74.6250 
1998  3,878,825.55  1.9    242,256.26    84.3679 
1999  5,543,208.36  1.6    231,661.69    92.5284 
2000  7,685,752.10  1.2    331,056.73    109.5500 
2001  8,920,443.16  1.0    454,379.74    112.9500 
2002  10,481,270.30  1.6    546,735.76     
             7    8        9      10           11 
        a 
Rule of Law  Turmoil 
(Workstopages) 
Mon-Days Cost  








RL  TUM  Exp  Imp  GOC  GCP 
  2218223  11023.3  12839.6  14,599.83   
  9652400  8206.4  10770.5  15,034.36   
  404822  7502.5  8903.7  16,518.83   
  301809  9088.0  7178.3  15,274.79   
  118693  11,720.8  7062.6  16,194.59   
  461345  8,920.6  5,983.6  16,516.63   
  142506  30,360.6  17,861.7  16,311.49   
  230613  31,192.8  21,445.7  20,410.41   
  579968  57,971.2  30,860.2  22,225.52   
  1339105  109,886.1  45,717.9  25,297.11   
  2257382  121,535.4  87,020.2  27,988.71   
  966611  207,266.0  145,911.4  45,067.43   
  6192167  218,770.1  166,100.4  60,841.03   
  234207748  206,059.2  162,788.8  195,237.64   
  2269037  950,661.4  755,127.7  271,642.69   
  94664  1,309,543.4  562,626.6  315,612.03   
  359801  1,241,662.7  845,716.6  377,779.00   
  47631  751,865.7  837,418.7  450,720.15   
  3158087  1,189,006.5  862,507.3  557,006.84   
  6287733  2,287,400.3  692,232.8  574,234.39   
  1027123  2,006,498.9  1,240,241.3  607,507.40   
        757,856.23   Notes: 
a Turmoil = Largescale protests general strike + Demonstration +  
terrorism + guemla warfare+Cinlwar + Cross border war. 
b Natural Resources = Mineral resources + Agricultural resources. 
c 1981 - 1994 - Naira official cross exchange rates 
  1995-2001 - Naira afem cross exchange rates. 
d 1986, 87, 94, 95 => 0 assumed for these years exchange rate used to proxy 







Gross output at current price 
 
MINERAL RESOURCES AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES 
   1      2      3      4    5          6 




and Natural Gas N 
Million  
Metal ores 
N Million  
 
Quarrying & 
other Mining N  





Production N  
Million 
  CM  CPG  MO  QM  MR  CP 
1981  104.95  11,053.73  46.12  9,936.13  21,140.93  12,132.44 
1982  50.67  9,298.00  35.36  9,777.20  9,9161.23  13,584.77 
193  47.95  8,050.59  28.85  7,517.45  15,644.84  15,501.41 
1984  68.76  9,807.82  26.32  6,613.96  16,516.86  20,361.77 
1985  128.48  12,248.65  20.68  4,823.32  17,221.13  23,741.57 
1986  128.48  10,604.87  5.13  2,753.66  13,492.14  24,593.33 
1987  115.81  29,469.62  29.85  3,148.98  32,492.14  37,547.10 
1988  83.69  33,056.45  29.60  3,571.71  36,741.45  58,551.27 
1989  82.79  84,917.63  20.18  6,643.38  91,673.98  68,054.34 
1990  83.69  109,727.77  30.78  7,499.08  117,341.32  82,295.26 
1991  157.43  129,308.94  23.28  8,446.04  137,935.69  96,230.68 
1992  109.48  273,945.94  14.47  10,530.65  284,600.54  145,208.56 
1993  57.00  268,707.25  14.13  13,821.83  282,600.21  235,920.15 
1994  79.17  243,176.39  16.77  17,795.88  261,068.21  357,816.07 
1995  28.50  850,816.14  23.44  23,758.93  874,627.01  635,488.92 
1996  34.83  1,285,539.20  26.81  27,650.45  131,2965.29  858,579.89 
1997  38.45  1,186,539.96  25.28  32,362.34  1218966.03  971,616.39 
1998  39.36  817,824.68  26.07  42,879.97  860,770.1  1,073,008.38 
1999  42.98  1,137,130.28  27.48  47,446.01  1184646.75  1,140,524.95 
2000  48.40  2,427,163.94  29.44  52,647.55  2479889.33  1,202,936.73 
2001  46.60  2,468,219.91  29.27  68,848.47  2537144.25  1,598,270.26 
2002  51.12  2,719,917.42  33.18  68,848.47     
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics national Accounts of Nigeria.  
      Federal office of Statistics Annual Abstract of Statistics 
      Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin. 
 
  
















1,723.44  985.74  1,628.99   
 
  
2,627.00  990.54  2,002.36     
3,428.76  1,075.68  2,941.85     
4,417.79  1,171.77  2,572.47     
4,757.36  1,246.51  1,600.07     
4,992.77  1,335.40  2,243.96     
5,596.97  1,350.77  1,961.23     
5,950.47  1,581.23  3,440.02     
7,892.26  1,920.69  7,142.13     
9,468.60  2,071.06  9,490.81     
10,425.89  2,147.50  10,580.49     
15,413.53  2,636.33  13,952.27     
24,482.28  3,495.28  3,495.76     
36,348.87  5,272.37  22,709.89     
65,062.75  7,274.27  42,912.02     
87,289.01  9,138.28  67,568.25     
97,076.10  11,064.63  81,595.63     
105,968.29  13,996.82  98,956.63     
110,024.59  17,014.68  114,138.80     
115,256.30  21,587.37  121,553.20     
151,953.80  26,422.94  168,034.64     
178,959.57  33,292.84  210,952.62     
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics national Accounts of Nigeria.  
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